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NOTES
A VOTE PROPERLY CAST? THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
THE NATIONAL VOTER REGISTRATION ACT OF 1993
As long as ours is a representative form of government .... the right to elect
legislators in a free and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our political system.
-Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
[Ilnherent in the very concept of a supreme national government with national
officers is a residual power in Congress to insure that those officers represent their
national constituency as responsively as possible.
-Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124 (1970).
INTRODUCTION
The United States of America has long been an inspiration to others as a model
of democratic government. Beginning with the colonial battle cry "no taxation without
representation" over 200 years ago, Americans, despite their many differences, have
long agreed that government must rest on the consent of the people as determined at
the ballot box. The right to vote, which was once limited to white male property own-
ers, now extends to any person meeting minimum age, residency, and citizenship quali-
fications. In effect, nearly every American age 18 or older may cast a ballot in a local,
state or federal election.
Ironically, however, fewer and fewer Americans are exercising this right. The
United States undoubtedly has one of the lowest voter participation rates in the indus-
trialized world.' Voter turnout for presidential elections tends to exceed that for all
other elections, and yet barely half of eligible Americans have voted in recent presi-
dential contests.2 Turnout for local,3 state,4 primary,5 and off-year congressional elec-
tions6 has been even lower. In effect, less than half the American population decides
1. During the 1980s, the highest voter turnout rate in an industrialized country in which voting
was not mandatory occurred in Belgium at 94%. Of major European nations, West Germany had 87%
voter turnout during this same period, the United Kingdom 74%, and France 70%. Only Switzerland,
at 49%, had a lower turnout rate during the 1980s than the United States. RuY A. TEixEiRA, THE
DISAPPEARING AMERICAN VOTER 8 (The Brookings Institute ed. 1992).
2. Turnout for the 1988 presidential election was 52.8%. TEiXEiRA, supra note 1, at 1. This
amount improved to 54% in 1992. S. REP. No. 6, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1993).
3. For example, less than 21% of eligible voters cast their ballots in the March 14, 1995 special
election held to fill a vacant City Council seat in San Jose, California. Mary Anne Ostrom and Scott
Herhold, Dando, Maben Face May Runoff, S.J. MERC. NEws, Mar. 15, 1995, at lB.
4. In the statewide November 1994 election in California, only 36.4% of eligible voters partici-
pated. Jerome Karabel, If Clinton Turns Right, Democrats Will Lose, S.F. ExAM., Dec. 9, 1994, at
A21.
5. For instance, in the June 1994 primary in California only 35% of eligible voters cast their
ballots. Id.
6. Only 36% of the eligible electorate participated in the 1986 and 1990 elections for Congress.
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who shall occupy the elected offices of the nation's cities, states, and federal govern-
ment.
For a people who have always taken great pride in their democratic heritage, this
is an ironic circumstance indeed. While the American electorate admittedly can influ-
ence the political process in a variety of other ways, when it comes to actually casting
a ballot the United States is fast becoming the world's leading non-participatory de-
mocracy. Tens of millions of eligible voters regularly remain on the sidelines and play
no role in this element of the American political process.' This trend has worsened
steadily since the early 1960s.'
According to the United States Congress, however, this state of affairs is not an
immutable one. In an effort to increase citizen participation in federal elections.9 Con-
gress recently passed the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 ("NVRA" or the
"Act").' ° President Bill Clinton signed the Act into law on May 20, 1993, and for
most states it became effective on January 1, 1995." This Article explores whether
passage of NVRA was a valid exercise of the constitutional power of Congress to
regulate federal elections, but first some background information on the intent behind
the statute and its provisions is in order.
Noting that the explanation Americans most frequently offer for not voting is
that they are not registered, Congress singled out state voter registration laws 2 as one
cause of the low turnout rate. 3 While debating NVRA, Congress labeled these proce-
dures "discriminatory and unfair," and an unreasonable hindrance on the fundamental
right to vote. 4 Declaring that "[i]t is the duty of the Federal, State and local govern-
TEIXEIRA, supra note 1, at 6. This amount increased to 38.8% in 1994. Kevin Galvin, Voters Found
to be 'De-aligning' from Parties, S.J. MERc. NEWS, June 26, 1995, at 4A.
7. Approximately 44% of eligible voters did not participate in the 1992 presidential election.
H.R. REP. No. 9, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1993).
8. Turnout for the 1960 presidential election was 65%. However, 1968 was the last contest in
which turnout exceeded 60%. Since then, voter participation has hovered between 52-57%. This decline
is especially precipitous when compared with voter turnout for presidential elections last century: be-
tween 1840 and 1916 voter participation only once dipped below the 60% level, and turnout of 80%
of eligible voters was not unusual. TEIXEIRA, supra note 1, at 9.
9. To avoid numbing repetition and for purposes of style, the terms "federal election" and "con-
gressional election" are used interchangably in this Article, even though the latter is technically part of
the former.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg et seq. (Supp. 1993).
11. To say that NVRA was enacted under politically charged circumstances would be putting it
mildly. Similar legislative efforts had been made as far back as the 1970s, only to fall victim to parti-
san bickering over a range of issues. More recently, President George Bush vetoed a "motor voter"
bill in 1992. Were it not for a two-year window (1993-95) in which Democrats controlled both Con-
gress and the White House, NVRA likely never would have become law. Republicans in the 103rd
Congress almost uniformly opposed it, claiming such detailed regulation of voter registration, even for
federal elections, unjustly interfered with state sovereignty, imposed unreasonable costs on states, and
increased opportunities for voter fraud. See Minority Views, S. REP. No. 6, supra note 2, at 50-57;
H.R. REP. No. 9, supra note 7, at 34-37.
12. All 50 states except North Dakota have some form of advance or election-day registration.
For detailed analyses of how state voter registration laws burden potential voters, see Deborah S.
James, Note, Voter Registration: A Restriction on the Fundamental Right to Vote, 96 YALE L.J 1615
(1987); Mark Thomas Quinlivan, Note, One Person, One Vote Revisited: The Impending Necessity of
Judicial Intervention in the Realm of Voter Registration, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2361 (1989).
13. Congress acknowledged that many elements factor into a full explanation of why voter turnout
is so low in the United States, but enacted NVRA on the ground that the law "is one positive action
Congress can take to give the greatest number of people an opportunity to participate." H.R. REP. No.
9, supra note 7, at 3.
14. S. REP. No. 6, supra note 2, at 2; H.R. REP. No. 9, supra note 7, at 5.
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ments to promote the exercise" of the right to vote, NVRA requires states to adopt
uniform voter registration procedures for federal office elections. 5
By simplifying and expanding the registration process, NVRA seeks to increase
voter participation in federal elections. While debating the Act two years ago, Congress
noted that at least 85-90% of registered voters cast their ballots in recent presidential
elections. 6 Yet, before NVRA, only about 60% of eligible Americans were registered
to vote." Congress therefore reasoned that at least part of the solution to the low
turnout problem lies in getting more people to register.'
NVRA's prescriptions for the registration process are thorough and quite de-
tailed.' Under the Act, states must allow all applicants for driver's licenses to regis-
ter to vote on the same form--commonly referred to as "motor voter."20 Registration
forms also must be made available at most state public agencies, including libraries,
schools, county clerk's offices, and welfare bureaus.2' Further, NVRA provides for
uniform (and convenient) mail and day-of-election registration.22 Detailed rules gov-
ern when state election officials may purge voters from registration lists.23 One impor-
tant deviation from most state laws is that voters, so long as they have not moved,
may not be purged simply for not voting.24
NVRA thus is a frontal assault on the burdens state registration laws have placed
in the past on the right to vote.2" The onus of initiating the registration process has
clearly shifted from the citizen to state government." Now, in states that have fully
15. As defined by NVRA, "Federal office" refers to the Senate, House of Representatives, Presi-
dent, and Vice President. NVRA took this definition from the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.
See 2 U.S.C. § 431(3). NVRA's limitation to federal elections is required by the Constitution: it was
reaffirmed in Oregon v. Mitchell that Congress has no authority to regulate local and state elections,
other than to rid them of constitutional infirmities. 400 U.S. 112 (1970). In practice, however, NVRA
will have a substantial impact on state registration procedures because currently only two states (Illi-
nois and Mississippi) separate registration for federal elections from that for state and local contests.
The remaining 48 states maintain a unitary system of voter registration. Telephone Interview with
Holly Wiseman, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section, U.S. Department of
Justice (Aug. 29, 1995).
16. S. REP. No. 6, supra note 2, at 2; H.R. REP. No. 9, supra note 7, at 3.
17. H.R. REP. No. 9, supra note 7, at 3. Elections experts have calculated that there were 190
million eligible voters in the United States at the beginning of 1995. However, only 120 million of
these were registered to vote. B. Drummand Ayres, Jr., Law to Ease Voter Registration Has Added 5
Million to the Rolls: But Ultimate Success Hinges on Actual Turnout, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1995, at 1,
27.
18. S. REP. No. 6, supra note 2, at 2; H.R. REP. No. 9, supra note 7, at 3.
19. In Voting Rights Coalition v. Wilson, 60 F.3d 1411, 1413 (9th Cir. 1995), the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit criticized the Act as a "complex statute of ten sections bearing the
marks of legislative draftsmanship similar to those borne by the Internal Revenue Code." See discus-
sion of this case infra at note 37.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-3.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-5.
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg-2 & 4.
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg-6(c) & (d).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(a)(3).
25. Studies done before NVRA was enacted concluded that eliminating three particular impedi-
ments-closing dates, purging for non-voting, and being able to register only during working
hours-would account for the vast majority of the increase in turnout. Teixeira, supra note 1, at 12.
NVRA eliminates the latter two impediments, but allows states to maintain a closing date of no more
than 30 days. The "motor voter" element of the Act is also expected to be effective because approxi-
mately 85-90% of eligible voters obtain or renew a driver's license every four years. S. REP. No. 6,
supra note 2, at 5.
26. The United States is the only Western democracy lacking some form of compulsory or auto-
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implemented NVRA, requests for clerical assistance in most state offices must be met
with the following reply, or something like it: "How can I help you? And, by the way,
would you like to register to vote? Here are the forms."" Congress apparently intend-
ed this result: "It must be remembered that the purpose of our election process is not
to test the fortitude and determination of the voter, but to discern the will of the major-
ity. 2
s
While there are obviously no guarantees that new registrants will actually turn
out on election day, NVRA represents the federal government's attempt to turn
around the currently abysmal rate of electoral participation.29 At least with regard to
increasing voter registration, the law has had an immediate impact. Initial data suggest
that voter registration has already markedly increased in states that have fully complied
with NVRA.30 Nationally, approximately five million voters were registered during
the first eight months that the law was in effect.31 The bulk of the new registrations
have taken place at state departments of motor vehicles. a2
Besides its broad sweep, the most striking aspect about the Act is its imperative
tone. States are required to do whatever is necessary, including amending their own
constitutions, to comply with the law's detailed provisions.33 All costs of adminis-
tering the law are borne by the states, with no financial assistance from the federal
government. Even though the majority of states already had some form of agency-
based and mail registration before NVRA,34 and the costs of implementing the law
are far from clear,35 the unfunded mandate element of the law has been the source of
matic registration. James, supra note 12, at 1631. The American system of placing the entire burden
of registration on the individual has been described elsewhere as "obsolete." Quinlivan, supra note 12,
at 2376.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-5(a)(6)(B)(i).
28. S. REP. No. 6, supra note 2, at 3.
29. Various studies done by political scientists using statistical models concluded that liberalizing
registration procedures would increase voter turnout by 7-9%. See generally TEIXEIRA, supra note 1, at
110-112.
30. Twenty-six states saw registration rates increase three to thirteen times above normal levels
during the first month (January 1995) that NVRA was in effect. Elizabeth Spaid, 'Motor-Voter' May
Steer Future Election Outcomes Rather than Boon for Democrats, Law Prompts Flood of Independents,
CHRIST. Sc. MoNrroR, Apr. 3, 1995, at 3. Referring to the drastic increase in registration rates, Geor-
gia Secretary of State Max Cleland remarked: "We have never witnessed anything like this in Georgia
history." Ben Smith III, Motor Voter Law Driving up Registration Rates in Ga., ATLANTA JJATLANTA
CONST., Mar. 4, 1995, at Cl.
31. B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Law to Ease Voter Registration has Added 5 Million to the Rolls,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1995, at 1. It has been estimated that the law might register 20 million new
voters by the November 1996 elections. Spaid, supra note 30, at 3. Long-term projections vary, but
optimistic estimates predict that 80-85% of the eligible electorate, or 40 million additional voters,
might be registered under NVRA by the year 2000. Ayres, at 1.
32. Telephone Interview with Holly Wiseman, supra note 15. See also Ayres, supra note 31, at 1.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-2(a).
34. Prior to NVRA, 27 states and the District of Columbia had some form of both "motor voter"
and mall registration. Fourteen of these states also permitted voters to register at other state agencies.
S. REP. No. 6, supra note 2, at 7.
35. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that it would cost states and municipalities approx-
imately $20 million per year for each of the first five years to comply with NVRA. S. REP. No. 6,
supra note 2; H.R. REP. No. 9, supra note 7. U.S. Postmaster General Marvin Runyon testified before
Congress that the Act would cost the U.S. Postal Service $2.1 million in 1995, because it requires the
Service to provide third-class rates to voter registrars. Greg Pierce, Postal Chief says 'Motor-Voter'
Will Eventually Force Rate Boost, WASH. TIMES, May 5, 1995, at AS. Other cost estimates vary wide-
ly. For example, a spokesman for U.S. Senator Paul Coverdell (R-Ga.) put the figure at $3 million
annually, plus $6.6 million in initial costs, for Georgia alone. Interview with Chris Allen (National
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considerable political consternation.
More precisely, as this Article went to press on November 1, 1995, six states had
been sued by the U.S. Department of Justice 6 for non-compliance with NVRA: Cali-
fornia," Pennsylvania,38  Illinois,39  South Carolina,' Michigan,4  and Virginia.42
Most of these states have refused to comply on Tenth Amendment43 grounds, claim-
ing that NVRA unconstitutionally infringes on the sovereign independence of state
government agencies." Several governors have also expressed concerns about possi-
ble increases in voter fraud. As a result of these lawsuits, the legal jousting over
Public Radio broadcast, Apr. 4, 1995). The State Department of Finance in California initially estimat-
ed that it would cost the state $38 million per year to implement the law; former California Secretary
of State Tony Miller, however, put the figure closer to $5 million. L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1995, at 1.
California Governor Pete Wilson later revised his estimate to $18 million per year. S.F. CHRON., July
25, 1995, at All. Congressman Paul Gillmor (R-Oh.) claimed it will cost Ohio $20 million per year
to comply with NVRA, but offered no evidence to support this estimate. Gillmor, Reconstruction of
Federalism: A Constitutional Amendment to Prohibit Unfunded Mandates, 31 HARV. J. LEGIS. 395
(1993).
36. NVRA permits the Attorney General to enforce the law and also creates a private right of
action. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-9.
37. The battle over NVRA in California started in the summer of 1994 when Gov. Wilson or-
dered state agencies not to comply with the Act until Congress appropriated funds to offset
California's implementation costs. Governor's Exec. Order No. W-98-94 (Aug. 12, 1994). On July 24,
1995, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Voting Rights Coalition v. Wilson declared
NVRA to be constitutional. 60 F.3d 1411 (9th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit's decision affirmed the
U.S. District Court's ruling in Wilson v. United States, 878 F.Supp. 1324 (N.D. Cal. 1995). As a
result of a permanent injunction issued by the district judge, California has been complying with
NVRA since June 19, 1995, pending the outcome of further appeals. On October 23, 1995, Gov. Wil-
son asked the Supreme Court to review the Ninth Circuit's ruling. California's petition for writ of
certiorari was still pending when this article went to press.
38. In Ass'n of Community Org. for Reform v. Ridge, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3933 (E.D. Pa.
March 30, 1995) (mem.), NVRA was upheld by a U.S. District Court in Pennsylvania. As a result of
that decision, Pennsylvania immediately began complying with NVRA and did not pursue additional
legal challenges.
39. On June 5, 1995, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld NVRA in Ass'n
of Community Org. for Reform v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791 (7th Cir. 1995), affg 880 F. Supp. 1215 (N.D.
I1. 1995). Shortly thereafter, Illinois began complying with NVRA and declined to file a petition for
writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court. However, Illinois at that time opted to switch to a
dual registration system, so that voters in that state will have to register separately for state or local
elections. Only federal elections in Illinois will be governed by NVRA. See Ass'n of Community Org.
for Reform v. Edgar, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8147, at *2 (June 8, 1995) (mem.).
40. In one of his last official acts before leaving office, outgoing Governor Carroll Campbell
vetoed NVRA compliance legislation in January 1995. The U.S. Attorney General filed suit against
South Carolina one month later. On November 10, 1995, U.S. District Court Judge Matthew Perry
upheld NVRA and ordered South Carolina to comply with the Act
41. Governor John Engler signed NVRA compliance legislation into law in January 1995, but
soon afterwards ordered some state agencies not to comply with NVRA. On December 13, 1995, a
U.S. District Court in Michigan ordered the state to implement the act.
42. Governor George Allen vetoed NVRA compliance legislation in May 1995. On July 3, 1995
several public interest organizations sued Virginia in federal court to force it to comply with NVRA.
The U.S. Department of Justice joined the lawsuit three days later. On October 3, 1995, a U.S. Dis-
trict Court in Virginia rejected the state's constitutional challenge, and Gov. Allen shortly thereafter
declared that he would comply with the Act.
43. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
44. Political dimensions continue to surround the debate over NVRA: each of the six states sued
thus far for non-compliance has a Republican governor. Not all states, however, have been so dour
about implementing the new law. An official with the Indiana State Elections Board described the
mood there as one of "excitement" over NVRA's potential to increase voter participation in Indiana.
Telephone Interview with John Koenig, Indiana State Elections Board (Jan. 27, 1995).
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NVRA's constitutionality is likely to continue into 1996, if not later. In light of the
number of states involved, an eventual ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court would not be
a surprising development, especially if the law is struck down by a lower federal court.
This, however, is increasingly unlikely. As of January 1, 1996, NVRA had been up-
held by six federal district courts and two federal appellate courts.
If Congress had any doubts about its constitutional power to enact the National
Voter Registration Act, the legislative history certainly does not betray them. When it
adopted NVRA, Congress claimed to be acting pursuant to its power under Article I of
the Constitution to regulate elections for Congress: "The Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by
the Legislature thereof; but the Congress by Law may make or alter such Regulations,
except as to the Place of chusing Senators."'45 While Congress also asserted that the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments permitted Congress to promulgate the Act, this
Article, for the sake of brevity, focuses exclusively on whether the Elections Clause
authorized Congress to enact NVRA.'
To answer this question, two crucial issues need to be addressed. First, does
Article I, Section 4 empower Congress to regulate the subject of voter registration?
Second, assuming Congress may indeed set uniform rules for voter registration, does
the Elections Clause permit Congress essentially to conscript the states to carry them
out? To address these issues, this Article is organized into four parts. Part I assesses
the original intent of the Framers for the Elections Clause. Part H examines the states'
initial understanding, as expressed during their ratifying conventions, of the scope of
congressional power under Article I, Section 4. Part III analyzes Supreme Court deci-
sions that have construed both the Elections Clause and breadth of congressional power
to regulate federal elections. Finally, Part IV discusses what role, if any, the Tenth
Amendment, and particularly the Court's recent decision in New York v. United
States,4' should play in adjudicating the constitutionality of the National Voter Regis-
tration Act. I ultimately conclude that the Elections Clause almost certainly permits
Congress to legislate on the subject of voter registration, but that the exact limits of
congressional authority to conscript state executive functions are less clear. At a mini-
mum, however, the Necessary and Proper Clause appears to justify NVRA's heavy
reliance on the states to carry out its provisions. I further conclude that if there are
limits on the power of Congress to act under Article I, Section 4, they were intended
primarily to be textual and political, and consequently do not arise out of the Tenth
Amendment, except possibly in the most extreme of circumstances. For these reasons,
I believe Congress was fully within its constitutional powers when it enacted the Na-
tional Voter Registration Act.
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. For purposes of style and convenience, the Elections Clause
will occasionally be referred to here as Article I, Section 4, even though Section 4 actually contains
two clauses.
46. The House and Senate committee reports on NVRA offered no detailed factual findings to
support their argument that state voter registration laws before NVRA offended the Reconstruction
Amendments. Federal court decisions construing the Act have focused almost exclusively on the Elec-
tions Clause, and have not discussed the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments in great detail, if at all.
47. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
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I. VIEWS OF THE FRAMERS
A. Introduction
Since the case law construing the Elections Clause is actually rather sparse, some
understanding of what the Framers originally intended is helpful. The issue of federal
elections, and what role Congress should play in regulating them, engendered remark-
ably little debate during the Constitutional Convention. As a result, the Elections
Clause emerged from the Committee of Detail on Monday, August 6, 1787 substantial-
ly resembling the final version that was adopted the following month. Generally, the
view that fixed rules on the times, places, and manner of federal elections should be
interpolated into the Constitution was rejected in favor of a more flexible approach. As
Hamilton noted in the Federalist Papers, the Convention decided to place such power
"primarily" with the state legislatures, but "ultimately" in Congress.'
Rufus King, a delegate from Massachusetts, noted that "no probability has been
suggested" of Congress abusing its authority to regulate its own elections. 9 None-
theless, not all delegates were so convinced: Charles Pinckney and John Rutledge,
from South Carolina, offered an amendment that would have left administration of
federal elections exclusively in the hands of the states.5° The only substantial recorded
comment on this proposal came from James Madison:
The necessity of a General Government supposes that the State Legislatures will
sometimes fail or refuse to consult the common interest at the expense of their
local convenience and prejudices. The policy of referring the appointment of the
House of Representatives to the people and not to the Legislatures ... supposes
that the result will be somewhat influenced by the mode .... These were words of
great latitude. It was impossible to foresee all the abuses that might be made of the
discretionary power."
In fact, this is the only recorded speech of any length at the Convention on the Elec-
tions Clause.
In the Federalist Papers, Madison further reasoned that if the American people
could be relied upon to elect judicious state legislatures, then they surely could be
invested with the same trust when voting for the House of Representatives. 2 And no
Congress elected in a thoughtful fashion, Madison concluded, would be prone to abuse
its power to regulate its own elections. 3 Madison implied not only that states might
abuse their power to control congressional elections, but that the accountability of
Congress to the people would prevent congressional abuse of the privilege. 4
Other delegates at the Constitutional Convention advanced arguments in favor of
the Elections Clause that would be made again when the Constitution went to the
states for ratification. Governor Morris of Pennsylvania maintained that "the states
48. THE FEDERALIST No. 59, at 362 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
49. 1 WiLBouiRN E. BENTON, 1787: DRAFrING THE U.S. CONSTITTON 647 (1986).
50. Id. at 646.





might make false returns and then make no provisions for new elections."55 Roger
Sherman of Connecticut asserted that the Elections Clause was intended to give Con-
gress the power to make entirely new regulations, "in case the states should fail or
refuse altogether."56
The Convention not only rejected Pinckney and Rutledge's motion; it further ex-
panded the scope of congressional power so that Congress could not only alter state
laws, but also make new ones of its own.57 By August 9, 1787, Article I, Section 4
was essentially in its final form.5" It would not be amended again until 1913, when
Senators became directly elected.59
B. Hamilton's Views in the Federalist Papers
In the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton explained in more detail why the
Constitutional Convention had concluded that Congress had to have the power to regu-
late its own elections. Most of his arguments presaged those made later in the state
ratifying conventions. The most oft-repeated was the first Hamilton offered on the
subject: "I am greatly mistaken... if there be any article in the whole plan more
completely defensible than this. Its propriety rests upon the evidence of this plain
proposition, that every government ought to contain in itself the means of its own pres-
ervation.' "
With his eye towards possible controversy in the state ratifying conventions,
Hamilton asserted that the federal government would intervene only "whenever ex-
traordinary circumstances might render that interdisposition necessary to its safety."'
The Framers' main concern, as Hamilton described it, was to provide a safety valve in
the event states failed altogether to hold congressional elections.62 In Hamilton's view,
most justified was the federal government's interest in ensuring that there be a uniform
time for congressional elections.63
The possibility of conspiracy dominated Hamilton's thinking on the subject of
federal elections. He conceded that there was some risk in placing such power in the
hands of Congress, but concluded that there was no other way to guarantee the exis-
tence of the federal government.' Hamilton emphasized (and perhaps exaggerated)
the chances of several state governments, or even foreign ones, jealous of the success
of the new nation, conspiring to thwart the holding of elections for Congress, effective-
ly dissolving that body.'
At the same time, Hamilton downplayed the odds that the federal government
itself could ever harbor such conspiratorial propensities. He argued that since the
House of Representatives would be a national body, it would likely be composed of
55. Id. at 648.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 649.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
60. THE FEDERALiST No. 59, at 362 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961) (emphasis
in original).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 363.
63. Id. No. 61, at 375-76.
64. Id. No. 59.
65. Id.
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diverse factions with inconsistent and divergent interests.' Noting the great variance
in the methods that would be used to select the President, Senate, and House of Repre-
sentatives, Hamilton concluded that there was little chance the several branches of the
government could conspire to undermine the right of the people to elect the House of
Representatives.67
In a theme Madison would later emphasize in Virginia's ratifying convention,
Hamilton asserted that the ultimate check against congressional abuse was political in
nature:
Would they [Congress] not rather boldly resolve to perpetuate themselves in office
by one decisive act of usurpation[?] ... Would they not fear that citizens, not less
tenacious than conscious of their rights, would flock from the remotest extremes of
their respective States to the places of election, to overthrow their tyrants and to
substitute men who would be disposed to avenge the violated majesty of the peo-
ple?"
C. Conclusion: Views of the Framers
These debates permit a few general conclusions helpful to assessing the constitu-
tionality of NVRA. First, although the circumstances under which Congress would
preempt state law were assumed to be infrequent, the scope of the Elections Clause
was conceded to be fairly broad. As Madison remarked, "[T]hese were words of great
latitude." Article I, Section 4 reflected a policy choice to give Congress the means it
would need to safeguard the integrity of the electoral process. Second, Hamilton hinted
at what the people's remedy would be if Congress tried to manipulate election pro-
cesses to create an aristocracy. Such casual talk about overthrowing governments ad-
mittedly. must be placed in historical context, but it does reflect a preference for the
give-and-take of the political process, if Congress ever went too far.
Unfortunately, the recorded speeches of the Constitutional Convention and the
Federalist Papers shed little light on two issues crucial here to ascertaining the consti-
tutionality of the National Voter Registration Act: the ceiling of congressional authority
under Article I, Section 4--whether it includes the power to control voter registration
procedures-and the ability of Congress to use state executive and administrative agen-
cies to implement federal election laws."° The debates in the ratifying conventions
fortunately shed some light on the former, but say nothing about the latter.
66. Id. No. 60, at 390-91.
67. Id. at 391.
68. Id. at 395.
69. BENTON, supra note 49, at 647.
70. The Framers obviously had general notions about the extent to which state legislatures and
executives could be conscripted to execute federal law. However, I do not explore these here because
in my view the Elections Clause, due to the specific nature of the subject it regulates, implicates a
special arrangement in this regard. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371
(1879), construed it as such. Consequently, the relationship that exists between the state and federal
governments under Article I, Section 4 cannot be compared to the Framers' more general ideas about
commandeering of state governments.
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II. STATE RATIFYING CONVENTIONS
A. Introduction
In light of the oppressive methods the English used to rule the American colo-
nies before the Revolution, the states' reservations about giving Congress a constitu-
tionally-based power to control its own elections were understandable. However, these
concerns were qualitatively different than those preoccupying some of the states today
with the National Voter Registration Act. Two hundred years ago, the states were most
worried about possible misuse of "place" regulation. More precisely, some of the Rati-
fiers feared that Congress, by locating polling places in remote settings, would effec-
tively disenfranchise particular classes of voters, and essentially establish an aristocra-
cy. Objections to the Elections Clause were also grounded on more general concerns
about placing such vast power in the hands of only one sovereign. This appeared to
contravene the otherwise strong emphasis in the new government on checks and bal-
ances. However, despite these misgivings, the Constitution was ratified with the Elec-
tions Clause fully intact.
Since he had spoken so favorably of it at the Constitutional Convention, James
Madison was a natural advocate for the Elections Clause at the Virginia ratifying con-
vention. There, Madison told the other delegates that the issue the Constitutional Con-
vention had to address was one of first impression: where to place the authority to
regulate an electoral process that had never taken place before.7 Writing specific pro-
visions into the Constitution, Madison noted, was rejected as impractical.72 The states
were deemed the most appropriate government bodies initially to regulate federal elec-
tions because they are "best acquainted with the situation of the people."' 3 Madison
reiterated the two main reasons the Convention decided to give Congress the power to
preempt state laws: to ensure uniformity and prevent the dissolution of the House of
Representatives.74
Opponents and proponents alike agreed that the authority of Congress under
Article I, Section 4, because it was so undefined, was fairly sweeping. For example,
Patrick Henry, a staunch anti-Federalist, declared that "[Tihe power over the manner
admits of the most dangerous latitude. They may modify it as they please .... I look
on [the Elections Clause] ... as the most fatal plan, that could ... enslave a free
people."' 5 George Mason, another Virginia delegate, noted that most delegates agreed
that federal interference would only be justified if a state legislature neglected or re-
fused to make -regulations, or was prevented from doing so by rebellion or invasion. 6
Hence, Mason argued, the broad language of the Elections Clause could be abandoned
71. 10 DocuMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1295 (J. Kaminski
et al. eds., 1990) (hereinafter DocUMENTARY HISTORY). In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115
S.Ct. 1842 (1995), the Supreme Court agreed with Madison's view when it rejected a Tenth Amend-
ment argument that states could "reserve" powers over federal elections. The Court reasoned that all
powers states hold over federal elections have been delegated to them by the Constitution, and thus
could not have been "reserved" within the meaning of the Tenth Amendment: "No state can say, that
it has reserved, what it never possessed." Id. at 1854 (internal quotations omitted).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1260.
74. Id.
75. 9 DocuMENTARY HISTORY 1071 (John P. Kaminski, et al. eds., 1990).
76. 10 DoCuMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 71, at 1290-91.
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in favor of specific exceptions written into the Constitution."
While conceding the pbtentially vast nature of congressional power, proponents
of the Elections Clause sketched out their own dramatic scenarios for what might
happen if the states were given the exclusive power to regulate federal elections. James
Wilson of Pennsylvania, for instance, exclaimed that
[i]f those legislatures possessed, uncontrolled, the power of prescribing the times,
places, and manner of electing members of the House of Representatives, the mem-
bers of one branch of the general legislature would be the tenants at will of the
electors of the other branch; and the general government would lie prostrate at the
mercy of the legislatures of the several states.7"
Other commentators were more sanguine, and thus incredulous at the ferocity of
the states' reaction to Article I, Section 4: "Marvelous, indeed, must be the sagacity
of him who discovers art, design, and despotic power wrapped up in this very harmless
clause!"79 Madison himself agreed that congressional control over time, place, and
manner could potentially be extensive, but downplayed the likelihood that such power
would be exploited or misused.'
The tone of the debate in the state ratifying conventions reveals that proponents
and opponents of the Elections Clause had similar motivations, but different values.
Both sides, emphasizing the Machiavellian side of public officials, outlined dramatic
(if not implausible) worst-case scenarios of abuses of centralized power. In this sense,
the gap between the two sides was not near as wide as it seemed; they should at least
have been able to understand each other's concerns, even if they could not agree. The
differences between them instead centered around policy priorities. These spirited
debates are a prism through which to view the basic values that divided the Federalists
and anti-Federalists. James Wilson of Pennsylvania, for one, openly declared that he
simply trusted the federal government more than the states:
Let us suppose [regulation] may be improperly exercised. Is it not more likely so to
be by the particular states, than by the government of the United States? Because
the general government will be more studious of the good of the whole ... when
the power of regulating the time, place, or manner of holding ... elections ... it
will be to correct the improper regulations of a particular state."
On the other hand, opponents such as Patrick Henry reminded the other Ratifiers
that lack of accountability in government was what drove the young nation to seek
independence in the first place.82 If the amendments some of the states offered during
the ratifying conventions are any guide, the delegates viewed the power of Congress to
regulate federal regulations to be broad indeed. For example, Virginia, heavily influ-
enced by George Mason on the question, proposed that Article I, Section 4 be amend-
ed so that Congress could interfere with state laws only under specific circumstances:
77. Id.
78. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 403 (Merrill Jensen ed. 1976).
79. A Letter from a Gentleman in a Neighboring State, to a Gentleman in this City. Anonymous
letter published in eight newspapers from New Hampshire to Maryland by Nov. 28, 1787. 3 DOCU-
MENTARY HISTORY 385 (Merrill Jensen ed. 1978).
80. 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 71, at 1295.
81. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 78, at 565-66.
82. 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 75, at 1070-71.
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"[C]ongress shall not alter, modify or interfere in the times, places, or manner of hold-
ing elections for Senators and Representatives, or either of them, except when the
Legislature of any state shall neglect, refuse, or be disabled by invasion or rebellion to
prescribe the same."83
Massachusetts offered a similar amendment that gained the support of six states.
It provided that Congress could not preempt state laws unless "a state shall neglect or
refuse to make the regulations therein mentioned, or shall make regulations subversive
of the rights of the people to a free and equal representation in Congress agreeably to
the Constitution."8 ' However, this amendment was never adopted. Dissenters in Penn-
sylvania, to no avail, advocated giving the states full control over federal elections.85
1. Regulation of the Time, Place, and Manner of Elections
The states' greatest concern was that Congress would use its power to regulate
the place of elections to locate polling places in remote and inconvenient settings,
which would effectively deny the franchise to those who could not travel long distanc-
es to vote. This particular worry occupied debate time at nearly every convention, and
was the subject of much discussion amongst the citizenry. James Spencer, who served
as a Captain in the Continental Army, wrote to James Madison: "[I1f they Appoint
Pepin or Japan, or their ten Miles Square for the place, no man can help it."86
In the first newspaper attack in Pennsylvania on the proposed Constitution, the
Freeman's Journal on September 26, 1787 ran the following editorial: "Leaving the
places subject to the alteration of Congress may also lead to improper consequences
and tempt to sinister views. Who in Pennsylvania would think it advisable to elect
Representatives on the shore of Lake Erie; or even at Fort Pitt?" '87 During Pennsylva-
nia's ratification debates, William Findley summed up the views of many delegates on
the subject: "[T]he modes of election will be appointed in such way as to give the
greatest influence to government .... The place of elections may be removed so as to
take it out of the reach of the lower and middling classes of men."88 However, pro-
posals to fix the place of elections in the Constitution garnered little support.
In response to these arguments, proponents of the Elections Clause were quick to
observe that the states retained the final authority to set voter qualifications for all
elections, including federal.89 Indeed, anti-Federalists deemed this aspect of the elec-
toral process an essential element of state sovereignty, which explained their concerns
that Congress, purporting to set the place of elections, might undermine this power.
83. 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 71, at 1555.
84. 2 J. ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONsTrrrnON 177 (1876). Massachusetts'
amendment was actually modeled on one George Mason initially proposed in a letter to John Lamb
dated June 9, 1788. Mason's amendment contained the following additional language: "or shall be
prevented from making Elections by Invasion or Rebellion; and in any of these Cases, such Powers
shall be exercised by the Congress only until the Cause be removed." 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 75, at 822.
85. "[The several states shall have power to regulate the elections for senators and representa-
tives, without being controlled either directly or indirectly by an interference on the part of Con-
gress[.]" 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 78, at 624.
86. 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 425 (John P. Kaminski, et. al. eds., 1988).
87. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 78, at 147.
88. Id. at 510.
89. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 60, at 394 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Mead Earle ed.,
1937). "The qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen, as has been remarked upon
other occasions, are defined and fixed in the Constitution, and are unalterable by the legislature."
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Hamilton, for one, lightly dismissed the states' arguments: the people, in his view, led
by the state governments, would sooner revolt against Congress than acquiesce to such
a blatant power grab.' °
On the other hand, congressional authority over the time of elections was much
more acceptable to the states, even to staunch anti-Federalists. Patrick Henry, for in-
stance, railed against possible abuses of the manner provisions, while conceding the
value of a uniform time and place for congressional elections.9 In a letter to William
Cushing, Samuel Holden Parsons of Connecticut summed up the rationale for giving
Congress control over the time of elections:
It appears to me proper that Congress should determine the time. Our different
legislatures haveon this subject gone into different practices. It is necessary all
elections should be in season to attend the federal legislature and expedient, at
least, they should be in one day throughout the Union. This can only be done by
the national authority.92
Besides reiterating the strong federal interest in uniformity, proponents of giving Con-
gress the ability to control the time of elections asserted that abuse was especially
unlikely in light of the outer limitations imposed by Article I of the Constitution.93 It
was often observed that regardless of what time Congress prescribed for federal elec-
tions, the Constitution at a minimum required that one-third of Senators, and all mem-
bers of the House of Representatives, be elected every two years. However, not all
delegates were persuaded: a vocal minority in Pennsylvania proposed that a time for
congressional elections be fixed in the Constitution.94
Compared to place and time, there was relatively little discussion of the manner
of elections. Since the first state voter registration law was not enacted until 1800,' 5
questions of manner and procedure necessarily implicated different concerns than those
at issue today. Nonetheless, a few comments made during the ratifying conventions
suggest that the states viewed congressional power over the manner of elections to be
broad enough to include modem-day voter registration.
During Pennsylvania's ratification debate, delegate Thomas McKean directly addressed
the issue of ballot procedures:
If, for instance, the states should direct the suffrage of their citizens to be delivered
viva voce, is it not necessary that the Congress should be authorized to change that
mode, so injurious to the freedom of election, into the mode by ballot, so happily
calculated to preserve the suffrages of the citizens from bias and influence? This
was one object, I am persuaded, which weighed with the late Convention in fram-
ing this clause[.]'
McKean later reiterated this view, only with a slightly different emphasis:
In some states the electors vote viva voce, in others by ballot; they ought to be
90. Id. No. 60, at 372.
91. 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 86, at 1071.
92. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 79, at 571.
93. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 59 (Alexander Hamilton).
94. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 78, at 629.
95. Massachusetts was the first state to adopt a voter registration law. JOSEPH HARRIS, REGISTRA-
TION OF VOTERS IN THE UNITED STATES 65 (1929).
96. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 78, at 413.
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uniform, and the elections held on the same day throughout the United States to
prevent corruption or undue influence. Why are we to suppose that Congress will
make a bad use of this power, more than the representatives of the several
states?"
McKean's comments suggest that the controlling factor in assessing the validity of
congressional control over the manner of elections is not the exact procedural aspect
that is regulated, but the purpose behind the legislation.
When viewed in this light, NVRA seems permissible. While ballot procedures
admittedly govern a different aspect of elections than voter registration, the policies the
Framers deemed so important-uniformity and the accessibility of the electoral pro-
cess-are implicated with no less force when the purity of the registration process is at
issue. The integrity of both of these elements, in a form comprehensible to the average
voter, is essential to a free and fair election. Thus, NVRA, if the Framers could know
about it, would not likely be seen as an abuse of congressional power. Moreover, if
Congress may regulate balloting, as delegates such as McKean maintained, then surely
it may also set rules for registration, which is arguably merely a component of the
balloting process.
2. The Possibility of Congressional Abuse
To assuage the concerns of opponents of Article I, Section 4, proponents offered
two reassurances: first, Congress, assuming the states regulated properly, would rarely
exercise this power; and second, even assuming Congress would try to abuse its au-
thority, structural and political constraints would thwart any attempt to undermine the
right of the people to elect their federal representatives. Each of these arguments will
be discussed in turn.
As noted above, Madison and Hamilton tried to reassure the states that the feder-
al interests the Elections Clause sought to protect were benign and fairly minimal:
ensuring uniformity of regulations and preventing the dissolution of Congress. Howev-
er, what constituted "proper" regulation by state legislatures, so as to avert congressio-
nal interference, was never clearly defined. Madison himself said little more than that
so long as federal elections are "regulated properly by the State Legislatures, the Con-
gressional control will very probably never be exercised. The power appears to me
satisfactory, and as unlikely to be abused as any part of the Constitution."'
What accounts for the fact that the Framers did not outline more precisely what
state legislatures had to do to avoid congressional intervention? Several states, such as
Virginia and Massachusetts, tried to codify a more specific standard in their proposed
amendments, but they were rebuffed. The best explanation perhaps is the emphasis the
Framers placed on flexibility when they designed the Constitution. Specific prescrip-
tions were rejected in favor of more general language whose interpretation could
evolve with the country as it grew and changed. Most delegates also probably believed
that the odds of Congress ever exercising this authority were fairly slim. Hence, there
was really no need to incorporate a list of specific exceptions. Madison, dismissing
worst-case scenarios as wildly improbable, likely spoke for many delegates when he
97. Id. at 537.
98. 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 71, at 1260.
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declared: "We must keep within the compass of human probability."
As for the proper remedy should Congress ever abuse these powers, it was often
pointed out during the ratifying debates that "[tihe people will be prejudiced against
Representatives chosen in... an unjudicious manner."'" Not surprisingly, these re-
cently-successful revolutionaries placed great stock in their right (and ability) to revolt
against an unjust government. Others were more idealistic about the new nation: James
Wilson of Pennsylvania, for example, asserted that Congress could be trusted not to
misuse its authority over federal elections because its very existence was owed to the
people."°1 Historical context aside, however, many delegates viewed the primary
check on congressional power under the Elections Clause to be structural and political
in nature, and not legal. George Nicholas, a delegate to Virginia's ratifying conven-
tion, expressed this sentiment when he declared:
The possible abuse here complained of, never can happen as long as the people of
the United States are virtuous: As long as they continue to have sentiments of
freedom and independence; should the Congress be wicked enough to harbour so
absurd an idea, as this objection supposes, the people will defeat their attempt, by
choosing other Representatives who will alter the law."°
Madison made a similar point, but placed more emphasis on the raw give-and-take of
the political process:
If all the people of the United States should be directed to go to elect in one place
the Members of the Government would be execrated for the infamous regula-
tion .... They would not dare to meet the universal hatred and detestation of the
people, and run the risk of the certain dreadful consequences. 3
The essence of Madison's argument was clear: the appropriate recourse for an unjust
regulation was the political process.
Pointing to the structure of the federal government, Madison further concluded
that the checks and balances created by the separation of powers helped preserve the
people's right to elect their representatives: "Have we not sufficient security against
abuse? Consider fully the principles of the Government .... [It] is subdivided in three
branches .... For the powers of Government which in every other country are given
to one body, are here given to two."'"° Thus, Madison rested on two arguments: the
decentralized nature of federal power would make abuse unlikely, and the machinery
of the legislative process would provide redress if such abuse ever occurred.
Other delegates made arguments remarkably similar to those underlying the
Supreme Court's opinion-200 hundred years later-in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro-
politan Transit Authority. 5 For example, James Wilson asserted that state sovereign-
ty under Article I, Section 4 was protected, if not by that clause itself, by the role the
Constitution gives the states in the selection of the federal government. To support this
view, Wilson cited state legislatures' power to choose Senators and presidential elec-
99. Id.
100. 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 75, at 965.
101. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 78, at 401.
102. 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 75, at 920.
103. 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 71, at 1295.
104. Id.
105. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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tors, the Senate's role in confirming Article III judges, Article V's guarantee that "no
State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate," and
the states' authority to amend the Constitution."6
It admittedly is somewhat anachronistic to speak of legal constraints on congres-
sional power in the 1780s: the Tenth Amendment was not adopted until 1791, and
judicial review was still over a decade away. Nonetheless, the specific mention by
some delegates of Garcia-like "process" theories counsels against importing too strong
a role for the courts when the constitutionality of a law enacted under the Elections
Clause-such as NVRA-is being challenged. After all, the Framers tried to design the
federal government so that the machinery of the legislative and electoral processes
could be harnessed to change the status quo. The speeches of some delegates indicate
this was the proper recourse if Congress ever abused its authority.
B. Conclusion: State Ratifying Conventions
The debates in the state ratifying conventions unfortunately shed no light on the
question of when Congress may use the states as implements of regulation. This is
largely because the federalism issues surrounding elections 200 years ago were of a
qualitatively different nature than those concerning some of the states today with
NVRA. By its plain language, Article I, Section 4 does not speak to the question of
the executive power; it merely declares that Congress may legislate on the subject.
What explains the Constitution's silence on this point? Perhaps the issue of federal
commandeering of state governments was too controversial and was sidestepped. It
also might simply have been overlooked, or viewed as unimportant. After all, the
abuse the states most feared was how Congress might manipulate the substance of
election regulations, and not who merely had to carry them out.
But more likely is that the Framers never envisioned the current scenario. Mat-
ters such as administrative cost and the "burden" of executing federal law have no
analog in our nation's early history. In the 1780s, the states-with good rea-
son-viewed the ability to control elections as a power and privilege, and not, in
today's terms, an unfunded mandate. In this sense, the situation currently surrounding
NVRA is unprecedented. Original intent therefore provides no direct answer for what
the Constitution requires when states, as with NVRA, actually decline to execute feder-
al election regulations.
There is a clear thrust, however, in some of the Framers' speeches that state
sovereignty is a secondary concern when the issue is federal elections. The principal
objective of the Elections Clause was to ensure that the right of the people to elect the
government was not abridged-whether this was achieved by state regulation or con-
gressional preemption. Fortunately, Supreme Court decisions construing the power of
Congress under Article I, Section 4 offer some guidance on this issue, and also on
whether the "manner" of elections includes voter registration.
106. 2 DocuMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 78, at 401-04.
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III. CASE LAW ON CONTROL OF FEDERAL ELECTIONS
A. Introduction
The Supreme Court has rarely been called upon to address the scope of congres-
sional authority under the Elections Clause. Since Congress has exercised this power
on just a few occasions, this is not surprising. The National Voter Registration Act is
actually the first federal statute to be promulgated under Article I, Section 4 in over
100 years. As such, most of the decisions construing the breadth of congressional
power to regulate federal elections are rather old, but they fortunately do address most
of the questions the Framers left unanswered. Put concisely, the federal courts long
ago abandoned the limited scope that was originally envisioned for the Elections
Clause by Hamilton and Madison. Judicial deference to Congress in this area has been
substantial.
The cases are relevant here in two important respects. First, voter registration is a
legitimate target of congressional action under the Elections Clause. Second, Congress,
according to an older Supreme Court decision, may use the states to implement federal
statutes that regulate federal elections. In addition to these points, I will address the
following issues in Part III: the Court's treatment of executive branch elections; the
role of the Necessary and Proper Clause in an assessment of NVRA's constitutionality;
and the Court's recent decision in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton.' 7 After a
brief review of laws enacted under the Elections Clause before NVRA, each of these
five points will be discussed in turn.
1. Prior Acts of Congress Regulating Federal Elections
An overview of the other statutes Congress has promulgated under Article I,
Section 4 helps place NVRA in historical context. The first Act of Congress to be
adopted under the Elections Clause was passed in 1842. It provided that the House of
Representatives be chosen by districts, rather than on an at-large basis." This elimi-
nated the common practice of electing a slate of representatives on a single ticket. In
1866, Congress enacted the first rules on time and manner for senatorial elections."l
Similarly, an Act of Congress passed on February 2, 1872 required that the House of
Representatives be uniformly elected on the Tuesday after the first Monday in Novem-
ber. In 1934, Congress last amended the statutes governing the time of elections for
the House and Senate, providing that representatives would take office in January of
the year after election instead of March."'
NVRA is actually not the first time Congress has regulated voter registration
procedures."' During Reconstruction, Congress enacted a detailed code for the con-
107. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
108. An Act for the apportionment of Representatives among the several States according to the
sixth census, ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491 (1846).
109. An Act to regulate the Times and Manner of holding Elections for Senators in Congress, ch.
245, 14 Stat. 243 (1868).
110. 2 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (Senate); 2 U.S.C. § 7 (1994) (House of Representatives).
111. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amend-
ed at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974(e)(1988 & Supp. IV 1992)) and subsequent amendments obviously
imposed substantial requirements on state registration processes, but Congress there was acting princi-
pally under the Reconstruction Amendments, and not the Elections Clause.
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duct of congressional elections." 2  The Supreme Court in United States v.
Gradwell"3 summarized the comprehensive nature of these statutes: "They made un-
lawful, false registration, bribery, voting without legal right, making false returns of
votes cast, interfering in any manner with the officers of election and the neglect by
any such officer of any duty required of him by state or federal law.""' Additionally,
Circuit judges could appoint election officers "to challenge any person proposing to
register or vote unlawfully, to witness the counting of votes, and to identify by their
signatures the registration of voters and intellectual tally sheets."' ' U.S. marshalls
were also given wide latitude to prevent breaches of the peace."6
Gradwell described federal control of congressional elections under this statutory
scheme as being "comprehensive and complete,""' but voiced no opinion on whether
Congress was within its power when it enacted such a detailed code for the elections
process."' As the political tide turned against Reconstruction, nearly all these laws
were repealed by 1894. Congress would not regulate voter registration again in any
detail until the Voting Rights Act of 1965. However, the objective there--eliminating
racial discrimination-was obviously very different than that behind
NVRA-expanding the number of registered voters. Thus, to the extent that the Re-
construction Amendments play no role in adjudicating NVRA's constitutionality, a
different analysis is required here: what is meant by the "manner" of elections?
2. Why Congress May Regulate Voter Registration
Before exploring this question, it is first necessary to address whether control
over registration resembles, or is equal to, the power to set voter qualifications, which
under the Constitution remains with the states. "' If voter registration is indeed more
like the latter, then NVRA should be unconstitutional.
This inquiry is best begun by distinguishing between substantive and procedural
rules. As a matter of plain language, "times, places, and manner" connote control over
procedural elements of the electoral process. 2° Literally construed, the power of
112. An Act to Enforce the Right of Citizens of the United States to vote in the several States of
This Union, and for other Purposes, ch. 114, § 19, 16 Stat. 144 (1871); An Act to amend the Natu-
ralization Laws and to punish Crimes against the same, and for other Purposes, Ch. 254, § 5, 16 Stat.
255-56 (1871); An Act making Appropriations for sundry civil Expenses of the Government for the
Fiscal Year ending June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and seventy-three, and for other Purposes, Ch. 415,
17 Stat. 348-49 (1873).
113. United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476 (1917).




118. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884), however, held that the statute that proscribed inter-
ference with federal election monitors was constitutional.
119. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), however, held that Congress could set a national
voting age of 18 for federal elections.
120. The Supreme Court in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995), distin-
guished the Elections Clause from the Qualifications Clauses on the substantive v. procedural dichoto-
my, also concluding that the Elections Clause governs only procedural aspects of the federal electoral
process: "The Framers intended the Elections Clause to grant States authority to create procedural
regulations, not to provide States with license to exclude classes of candidates from federal office." Id.
at 1869. The Court further noted that most state procedural regulations for federal elections have been
upheld. Id. at 1870. This further supports the conclusion that NVRA, if it too is deemed essentially
procedural in nature, must be constitutional.
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Congress under the Elections Clause should thus not extend to determining who may
cast a ballot, but only to how, when, and where ballots are to be cast. Viewed in this
light, there are fundamental differences between voter registration and voter qualifica-
tions. Registration is essentially a procedural means of organizing elections and ad-
vancing the right to vote. So long as the substantive personal requirements attached to
the right to register arise out of state law, and not federal law, a federal registration
statute enacted under Article I, Section 4 should not violate the states' right to set
voter qualifications.
NVRA meets this requirement. The Act speaks only to how and where registra-
tion is to be conducted. It does not lay down a set of personal characteristics that must
be met in order to register or vote. While NVRA's prescriptions are indeed detailed,
the Act does not cross the line into the realm of voter qualifications.
The more difficult question is whether the power to control the manner of elec-
tions gives Congress the authority to promulgate rules for the voter registration pro-
cess. At least four different arguments, all supported by the cases, compel an affirma-
tive answer. First, the power of Congress to regulate federal elections is vast. It thus
should include the authority to craft rules for voter registration. Second, the Supreme
Court has permitted Congress to regulate "necessary steps" in the electoral process. In
light of its essential administrative role, voter registration falls in this category. Third,
the Justices have been especially deferential when Congress has sought to advance
certain policies, such as promoting the free choice of representatives or preventing
fraud and voter intimidation. A uniform and accessible voter registration system ad-
vances these objectives. Finally, the Court explicitly declared in a 1932 case that Con-
gress may legislate on the subject of voter registration. Each of these arguments will
be discussed in turn.
In two older but important decisions, the Supreme Court indicated that the au-
thority of Congress to regulate federal elections is indeed expansive. In Ex parte
Siebold," the Justices addressed the constitutionality of an Act of Congress that
criminalized violations of certain state laws regulating federal elections. Writing for the
majority, Justice Bradley rejected the petitioners' contention that Congress, when mak-
ing its own regulations, had to preempt state law completely and occupy the area it-
self. 22 In holding that Congress could leave intact remaining state law that was not
inconsistent, the Court declared that
the power of Congress over the subject is paramount. It may be exercised as and
when Congress sees fit to exercise it. When exercised, the action of Congress, so
far as it extends and conflicts with the regulation of the State, necessarily super-
sedes them. This is implied in the power to "make or alter."' 23
On this ground, Justice Bradley held that the federal statute was constitutional.
In Smiley v. Holm, 24 the Court defined the legislative procedures states must
employ when reapportioning congressional districts. In dictum, Chief Justice Charles
Evans Hughes declared that the Elections Clause gives Congress the "authority to
121. Ex pare Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
122. Id. at 384.
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
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provide a complete code for congressional elections[.]', 2 5 The Chief Justice also stat-
ed that Congress has a "general supervisory power over the whole subject."'" 6 Since
Smiley, the power of Congress, if anything, has continued to grow. The Civil Rights
Movement of the 1960s engendered a new line of case law on the subject of federal
elections. When faced with challenges to the Voting Rights Act legislation that was the
product of that era, the Supreme Court continued to affirm that Congress enjoys wide
constitutional latitude when it regulates the electoral process.17 For example, in Ore-
gon v. Mitchell' the Court held, by a vote of 5-4, that Congress could establish a
national voting age of 18 in federal elections. Even though Justice Black was the only
justice in the majority to conclude that the Elections Clause gave Congress this author-
ity, 9 Mitchell was significant because its holding contravened the entrenched juris-
prudential maxim that the power to prescribe voter qualifications, even for federal
elections, is held exclusively by the states.
Applying the standard of the above cases to NVRA, registration too should be a
legitimate target of this broad power. A "complete code" for federal elections, as the
Court declared in Smiley, logically must include the methods that are used to keep
track of prospective voters. And in light of Mitchell's conclusion that voter qualifica-
tions are no longer a sacred province of state electoral autonomy, it is difficult to
assert that registration, which is much more analogous to the "manner" of elections
than voter qualifications, is beyond the prescriptive jurisdiction of Congress. A differ-
ent conclusion might be warranted if the Supreme Court had construed the power of
Congress under the Elections Clause to be narrow and specific, but this has simply not
been the case.
In a society as populated and mobile as the United States, voter registration is an
indispensable organizational and administrative tool. Indeed, only North Dakota---one
of the least inhabited states-conducts its elections without a voter registration sys-
tem.' Similar to the printing of ballots and the staffing of polling places, registra-
tion-regardless of when it occurs-is an essential link in the chain that is the elector-
al process. Elections in practice could not be conducted, and indeed are not, without it.
In United States v. Classic,' the Supreme Court declared that Congress under
the Elections Clause could regulate vital components of the electoral process. More
specifically, the Justices held that Congress could set standards for the conduct of
congressional primaries. Writing for the Court, Justice Stone reasoned that Article I,
Section 4 had to reach primary elections because they are a "necessary step in the
choice of candidates for election as representatives in Congress.'' 32 If it is accepted
that registration is also a "necessary step" in the electoral process, it too should fall
125. Id. at 366.
126. Id. at 366-67.
127. See generally Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (holding Voting Rights Act of
1965 constitutional).
128. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
129. Id. at 122. The rest of the majority relied on the Equal Protection Clause. See opinion of
Douglas, J., concurring. See Id. at 144 (opinion of Douglas, J., concurring). See also Id. at 240 (opin-
ion of Brennan, White and Marshall, JJ., concurring). Other Justices criticized the expansive interpreta-
tion Justice Black advocated for the Elections Clause. See, e.g., Id. at 209-12 (opinion of Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
130. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-02 (1994).
131. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
132. Id. at 320 (emphasis added).
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within the power of Congress to regulate federal elections. In a technical sense, regis-
tration is actually more fit for the Classic principle than primary elections, which are
not literally required because they could be phased out in favor of a single general
election. By contrast, eliminating all forms of voter registration would wreak adminis-
trative havoc on the electoral process: it would be almost impossible for states to ad-
minister elections or keep track of potential voters.
The Supreme Court has deferred to Congress most often when the policy ad-
vanced by a -federal election law is to promote the free choice of representatives. For
example, in Ex parte Yarbrough'33 the Court declared that Article I, Section 4 autho-
rized Congress to enact regulations that seek to deter fraud and voter intimidation.'3 4
At issue in Yarbrough was the constitutionality of an Act of Congress that made it a
federal crime to obstruct the lawful exercise of the right to vote on the ground of race
or previous condition of servitude. Noting that Congress had regulated federal elections
in the past to protect the integrity of the electoral process, the Justices asked rhetorical-
ly: "Will it be denied that it is in the power of [Congress] to provide laws for the
proper conduct of those elections?"' 35 Referring to the other Reconstruction laws that
strictly regulated federal elections at that time, Yarbrough put the states on notice that
when Congress "finds it necessary to make additional laws for the free, the pure, and
the safe exercise of this right of voting, they stand upon the same ground, and are to
be upheld for the same reasons."'
' 36
Subsequent decisions have granted Congress similar latitude. In Smiley, the Su-
preme Court concluded, albeit in dictum, that the Elections Clause permitted Congress
"to enact the numerous requirements as to procedure and safeguards which experience
shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right involved.' ' 37 And in
Classic, Justice Stone noted the constitutional purpose underlying Article I-to pro-
mote the "free choice by the people of representatives"' 3 -- and stated that so long as
Congress acted to protect this right, it would be within its constitutional powers.'39
Again, as in Yarbrough, the Court emphasized that Congress will be given the most
deference when its motive is to protect the purity of the electoral process."
While the facts and historical context underlying Yarbrough, Smiley, and Classic
were indeed different than those currently surrounding NVRA, the rationale of those
cases applies with no less force to the present. The one hundred years between Recon-
struction and the Civil Rights Movement proved that the "free exercise" of the right to
vote can certainly hinge on what type of voter registration procedures states decide to
use. NVRA's goal of making voter registration uniform and more accessible, if not
directly analogous to the objectives deemed so important in Yarbrough, Smiley, and
Classic, at least falls within the same genre of legitimate policy interests. Or, put more
concisely, NVRA targets voter registration for the right constitutional reasons.
The Supreme Court has never had to address directly whether the manner of an
election includes the subject of voter registration. Nonetheless, Chief Justice Hughes
133. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
134. Id. at 661-62.
135. Id. at 661.
136. Id. at 662 (emphasis added).
137. Smiley, 285 U.S. at 366.
138. Classic, 313 U.S. at 316.
139. Id. at 320.
140. Id. at 321.
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suggested in Smiley that the power of Congress does extend this far. Referring to the
Elections Clause, the Court declared:
It cannot be doubted that these comprehensive words embrace authority to provide
a complete code for congressional elections, not only as to times and places, but in
relation to notices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, preven-
tion of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and
canvassers, and making and publication of election returns[.]' 41
Since Smiley concerned state reapportionment of congressional districts, and not regis-
tration, this is just dictum. However, the above language, due to frequent and respected
citation, has since become quite authoritative.'42
In light of the broad authority the Supreme Court granted Congress in this area
during the Civil Rights Movement, it is difficult to imagine that the Court, if forced to
face the issue today, would counter Smiley and hold that Congress could not regulate
voter registration under the Elections Clause. Rather, the Justices' primary constitu-
tional concern would likely revolve around NVRA's heavy reliance on the states to
carry it out.
3. Using States as Implements of Regulation
The Supreme Court has previously addressed this issue and it is the only occa-
sion on which the Court has explained the extent to which Congress may use the states
to implement regulations enacted under the Elections Clause. In Ex parte Siebold and
Ex parte Clarke,4 a companion cases decided on the same day, the Justices had to as-
sess the constitutionality of several federal statutes that regulated elections for Con-
gress. Primarily at issue were two laws that criminalized certain activities including,
among other offenses, making false election certificates, interfering with ballot count-
ing, obstructing lawful voting, and interfering with the supervisors of election or U.S.
marshalls.'" Several state judges of election in Maryland and Ohio were convicted
under these laws and sentenced to fines and imprisonment.4 The defendants were
found to have obstructed U.S. marshalls and conspired to engage in "ballot stuff-
ing."'" The main question before the Court was whether a state election official,
when administering a federal election, owes a duty to the United States. On this point
a lengthy colloquy occurred between two Justices: Justice Bradley, who wrote the
majority opinion in Siebold; and Justice Field, who wrote the dissenting opinion in
Clarke. Each of these opinions, and their relevance to NVRA, will be discussed in
turn.
Siebold tackled some of the difficult federalism issues left unresolved by the
Framers. Justice Bradley, describing the nature of the relationship that exists between
the states and the federal government under the Elections Clause, described jurisdiction
over federal elections as "cooperative," "co-joint," and "concurrent."' 4  By this
141. Smiley, 285 U.S. at 366 (emphasis added).
142. See, e.g., Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 122-23. See also all six federal court decisions handed down
so far in the NVRA litigation supra at notes 37-39, 42.
143. Ex parte Clarke, 100 U.S. 399 (1879).
144. Rev. Stat. United States, §§ 5515 & 5522; see also Siebold, 100 U.S. at 371-74.
145. Siebold, 100 U.S. at 373; see also Clarke, 100 U.S. at 400.
146. Siebold, 100 U.S. at 373.
147. Id. at 383-85.
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Bradley meant that, when legislating on the subject of congressional elections, the state
legislatures and Congress have overlapping obligations and powers. " The Court
drew an analogy to the Commerce Clause" to support its argument that the Consti-
tution occasionally mandates different forms of shared jurisdiction.'
The majority in Siebold was fully aware that its vision of concurrent authority
tended to commingle political accountability, and therefore was perhaps a bad way to
make policy. Justice Bradley, however, concluded that the Constitution, in this in-
stance, required concurrent jurisdiction:
As a general rule, it is no doubt expedient and wise that the operations of the State
and national governments should as far as practicable, be conducted separately, in
order to avoid undue jealousies and jars and conflicts of jurisdiction and power.
But there is no reason for laying this down as a rule of universal application. It
should never be made to override the plain and manifest dictates of the Constitu-
tion itself .... There are very few subjects, it is true, in which our system of gov-
ernment, complicated as it is, requires or gives room for conjoint action between
the State and national sovereignties .... But in this case.... a concurrent juris-
diction is contemplated, that of the State, however, being subordinate to that of the
United States, whereby all question of precedency is eliminated.''
The Court fortunately delineated how its methodology-theoretical in nature despite its
unambiguous tone-applied in practice. Not only is federal law supreme, Justice
Bradley reasoned, but when regulating congressional elections, state officers are effec-
tively agents of the federal government if Congress decides to use them as such:
[W]hen, in the performance of their functions, State officers are called upon to
fulfill duties which they owe to the United States as well as to the State, has the
former no means of compelling such fulfillment?... It is the duty of the States to
elect representatives to Congress .... [The United States] is directly interested in
the faithful performance, by the officers of election, of their respective duties.
Those duties are owed as well to the United States as to the State. This necessarily
follows from the mixed character of the transaction, - State and national.5
The majority further clarified that "[w]here a person owes a duty to two sovereigns, he
is amenable to both for its performance; and either may call him to account."'5 3
The reasoning Justice Bradley employed was essentially utilitarian: he argued
that congressional regulation of federal elections would be ineffective if state election
officers were "amenable only to the supervision of the State government which ap-
pointed them."'54 Siebold thus helped answer an important question the Framers and
148. Id. at 391-92.
149. "The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes[.]" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. I & 3.
150. Siebold, 100 U.S. at 385. This analogy is not entirely apt because the Constitution does not
require states to regulate interstate commerce. Rather, a state's jurisdiction, so long as it is exercised
within the confines of the "dormant" commerce clause, is still entirely discretionary. By contrast, state
legislatures under Article I, Section 4 must prescribe regulations for the conduct of federal elections.
This distinction, had Justice Bradley noted it, actually would have strengthened his ultimate conclusion
that state election officials owe a duty to the federal government.
151. Id. at 392-93.
152. Id. at 387-8 (emphasis added).




Ratifiers failed to address: whether state election officials under the Elections Clause
may be conscripted to execute federal law. If these officers owe a duty to the United
States, as Siebold concluded, then of course they can.
Finally, Siebold also stands for the proposition that Congress may fully preempt
state executive functions:
[C]ongress may, if it sees fit, assume the entire control and regulation of the elec-
tion of representatives. This would necessarily involve the appointment of the plac-
es for holding the polls, the times of voting, and the officers for holding the elec-
tion; it would require the regulation of the duties to be performed, the custody of
the ballots, the mode of ascertaining the result, and every other matter relating to
the subject.'55
While language such as this indeed sent a strong message to the states during Recon-
struction, Justice Bradley had his detractors on the Court. Two Justices dissented from
the majority opinion. Justice Field wrote a lengthy dissent in Ex parte Clarke that
merits closer examination here because it clarified the scope of the majority's pre-
scriptions.'56 In the companion Clarke case, the Supreme Court upheld the same con-
gressional statutes at issue in Siebold.'5' The nub of the dissent's argument in
Clarke was that Congress has no power under any part of the Constitution to compel
state officers to execute federal law.' To support his argument, Justice Field relied
on Kentucky v. Dennison. There, the Supreme Court had stated that
[t]he Federal government, under the Constitution, has no power to impose on a
state officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to perform it; for if it
possessed this power it might overload the officer with duties which would fill up
all his time, and disable him from performing his obligations to the State[.]"59
Citing Chief Justice John Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland,'" Justice Field re-
jected the majority's vision of concurrent jurisdiction:
When, therefore, the Federal government desires to compel by coercive measures
and punitive sanctions the performance of any duties devolved upon it by the Con-
stitution, it must appoint its own officers and agents, upon whom its power can be
exerted. If it seems fit to entrust the performance of such duties to officers of a




Field's arguments dissipated any doubt that the majority viewed the power of Con-
gress to be almost all-encompassing.
155. Id. at 396.
156. Clarke, 100 U.S. at 404-22.
157. Id. at 403-04.
158. Id. at 409-11.
159. Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 107-8 (1860). (The part of Dennison that pro-
hibited federal courts from enforcing the Extradition Clause of the U.S. Constitution was overruled in
Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987)).
160. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, (1819). In McCulloch, Marshall argued:
"No trace is to be found in the Constitution of an intention to create a dependence of the Federal
government on the governments of the States for the execution of the great powers assigned to it. Its
means are adequate to its ends; and on those means alone was it expected to rely for the accomplish-
ments of its ends." Id. at 424.
161. Clarke, 100 U.S. at 413.
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Despite making strong and interesting analytical points, the dissent offered no
authority for its proposition that the Framers intended this "anti-commandeering" rule
specifically to apply to the Elections Clause. Instead, Justice Field extracted a more
general rule from Prigg v. Pennsylvania, in which Justice Story had declared: "[T]he
national government, in the absence of all positive provisions to the contrary, is bound,
through its own proper departments, legislative, judicial or executive, as the case may
require, to carry into effect all the rights and duties imposed upon it by the Constitu-
tion.""'6 The Elections Clause could have been one such "positive provision," but the
dissent-not surprisingly-did not explore this possibility.
Siebold's main prescriptions are easy to summarize: Congress has vast authority
to preempt state law, and when doing so may conscript state election officers to exe-
cute new regulations. Applied to NVRA, this decision would seem to quiet concerns
that have been raised about the Act's heavy reliance on the states to carry it out.
However, Siebold can be distinguished on several grounds. First, NVRA requires states
effectively to deputize employees of entirely independent state agencies to perform
voter registration, thus essentially transforming them, at least some of the time, into
election officials for the federal government. Does this go beyond Siebold, which con-
fined itself to cases involving actual state election officers? Perhaps, but in light of the
broad power the Necessary and Proper Clause has been construed to give Congress,
this is probably a distinction of little constitutional significance.
Along the same lines, Siebold did not address the issue of administrative costs.
Nor could it; the case involved the constitutionality of a law that did not contain the
"unfunded mandate" element so problematic, at least in the minds of some states, with
NVRA. The broad language of Siebold does, however, imply that even where federal
time, place, and manner regulations are a financial burden for the states, such laws still
pass constitutional muster. Moreover, Justice Field raised the matter of state resources
in his dissent in Clarke-seeming to concede that under the majority's rule the ad-
ministrative cost of executing federal election laws must indeed be borne by the states.
Other distinctions, however, are even more persuasive. First, and perhaps most
importantly, the case did not address "commandeering" in the specific context of voter
registration. There are important substantive differences between criminalizing particu-
lar forms of conduct, as in Siebold, and imposing a civil obligation to execute federal
regulations. Second, the decision is over 100 years old. The factual and technological
circumstances under which elections are conducted have changed dramatically since
1879. Thus, if ever forced to adjudicate the constitutionality of NVRA, the Supreme
Court could easily distinguish Siebold, on the ground that the case is antiquated and
was decided under entirely different facts.
4. Congressional Control of Presidential Elections
In Burroughs & Cannon v. United States,63 the Justices were called upon to
decide the constitutionality of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, which regulated dona-
tions to presidential election campaigns. The Court began its analysis by acknowledg-
ing that the Constitution distinguished between legislative and executive branch elec-
162. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 616 (1842) (emphasis added).
163. Burroughs & Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
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tions, with Congress having less authority over the latter." For example, the states,
and not Congress, control the appointment of presidential and vice-presidential elec-
tors.I5
Nevertheless, Justice Sutherland, writing for an 8-1 majority, upheld the regula-
tions. In declaring the statute constitutional, however, the Court did not cite any partic-
ular provision of the Constitution. Rather, the majority noted that the duties of execu-
tive branch electors emanate from the Constitution itself.6" According to the Court,
this gives Congress the authority to regulate the conditions under which these electors
are chosen:
The President is vested with the executive power of the nation. The importance of
his election and the vital character of its relationship to and effect upon the welfare
and safety of the whole people cannot be too strongly stated. To say that Congress
is without power to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard such an election from
the improper use of money to influence the result is to deny to the nation in a vital
particular the power of self protection.'67
Burroughs was important because its factual limitation to executive branch elections
forced the Supreme Court to explain for the first time the exact nature and extent of
congressional power over those contests. Prior to Burroughs, the Court was able to
avoid the question by discussing regulation of federal elections in more general terms.
Oregon v. Mitchell confirmed, if not expanded, the broad authority of Congress
to prescribe rules for the selection of presidential and vice-presidential electors. Also
by a vote of 8-1, the Court upheld an amendment to the Voting Rights Act that elimi-
nated durational residency requirements for executive branch elections. 6' The Justic-
es, however, could not agree on why the law was constitutional, 69 confirming the
opaque nature of congressional power in this particular area. Mitchell nevertheless
stands for the proposition that where not specifically constrained by the Constitution,
congressional power to regulate elections for President and Vice President is no less
expansive than that Congress enjoys under the Elections Clause. Justice Black, for one,
took this view in Mitchell: "It cannot be seriously contended that Congress has less
power over the conduct of presidential elections than it has over congressional elec-
tions."'' 0 NVRA's failure to distinguish between executive and legislative branch
elections is therefore probably of little constitutional significance. If NVRA ever reach-
es the Supreme Court, it is difficult to imagine the Justices upholding the law for one
branch of the federal government, but not the other. 7'
164. Id. at 544.
165. U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
166. Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 545.
167. Id.
168. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 124. The U.S. District Court in Association of Community Orgs. for
Reform v. Edgar, 880 F. Supp. 1215 (N.D. Ill. 1995), cited Mitchell to support this conclusion with
specific regard to NVRA.
169. Chief Justice Burger, along with Justices Stewart and Blackmun, relied on the Necessary and
Proper Clause; Justice Black cited the Court's decision in Burroughs and the Necessary and Proper
Clause; Justice Douglas relied on the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;
and Justices Brennan, White and Marshall rested on the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
170. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 124.
171. Noting that both the President and members of Congress are federal officers, the Supreme
Court in U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1855-56, hinted that the power of Congress to prescribe rules
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5. The Necessary & Proper Clause
In McCulloch v. Maryland,' Chief Justice John Marshall held that the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause' gives Congress a set of implied powers. Under this sup-
plemental authority, Congress may enact "appropriate" legislation that is "plainly
adapted" to carrying out its enumerated powers. The means chosen need not be indis-
pensable or absolutely necessary; they merely must be rationally related to a legitimate
constitutional objective.
Two Supreme Court decisions have explained how the Necessary and Proper
Clause impacts the ability of Congress to regulate federal elections. United States v.
Classic declared that the legitimate constitutional objective of Article I, Section 4 is
the "right of choice by the people of representatives in Congress."'7 There, the Jus-
tices followed the general trend of according Congress expansive authority under the
Necessary and Proper Clause, so long as new election rules advanced this goal.'75
The Court concluded that on this ground Congress could regulate congressional prima-
ies.
In Oregon v. Mitchell, Justice Black, delivering the judgment of the Court, de-
clared that Congress possessed a "residual power" to regulate federal elections under
the Necessary and Proper Clause:
Finally, and most important, inherent in the concept of a supreme national govern-
ment with national officers is a residual power in Congress to insure that those
officers represent their national constituency as responsively as possible. This pow-
er arises from the nature of our constitutional system of government and from the
Necessary and Proper Clause. 76
As discussed above, Justice Black concluded that under this authority Congress could
abolish durational residency requirements for presidential elections. Justice Stewart,
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, concurred in this result in a
separate opinion, although they did not accord the Necessary and Proper Clause the
same expansive reading as Justice Black.' The Necessary and Proper Clause is
helpful here because it helps ascertain whether NVRA's substantial reliance on the
arms of state governments to register new voters is constitutionally permissible. To
answer this question, a two-step analysis is required. First, what is the legitimate con-
stitutional objective of NVRA? Second, what means are rationally related to fulfilling
this goal? When it enacted NVRA, Congress exercised its enumerated power to pre-
scribe rules for the manner in which elections are conducted. More precisely,
NVRA's legitimate constitutional objective is making voter registration uniform and
more accessible. Agency-based registration bears a rational relationship to this goal
because it reaches prospective voters in ways other registration methods cannot. Con-
for presidential elections essentially equals the power Congress has to regulate its own contests.
172. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
173. "The Congress shall have Power ... To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. Art. I, §
8, cls. 1 & 18.
174. Classic, 313 U.S. at 320.
175. Id.
176. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 124 n.7.
177. Id. at 285.
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ceptually, agency-based registration thus appears to be constitutionally permissible
under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
The more difficult question is whether state government agencies, rather than
federal ones, are an appropriate means of carrying out agency-based registration. Why
couldn't NVRA simply have relied on the various offices of the federal government to
execute its provisions?... The states admittedly may not be absolutely essential to ful-
filling NVRA's goal, but the tentacles of local government reach potential voters in
ways federal government offices cannot. For example, welfare checks are distributed at
the state level; it consequently is difficult to imagine the federal government using its
own agencies to register welfare recipients to vote. An even better example is driver's
licenses, which are also issued exclusively by the states. It has been estimated that 85-
90% of the voting age population has a driver's license. 9 Hence, the "motor voter"
element of NVRA should give nearly all eligible Americans the chance to register to
vote in the next three to five years, when their licenses come up for renewal.
The states therefore are, at a minimum, a far more effective means of achieving
the constitutional objectives of NVRA. When seen in this light, NVRA's mandate that
states adopt agency-based registration passes the rational basis requirement of
McCulloch. To the extent that Article I, Section 4 itself does not permit Congress to
conscript the states to execute federal law, the Necessary and Proper Clause, at least in
this instance, provides independent constitutional support for such federal commandeer-
ing.
6. The Supreme Court's Decision in U.S. Term Limits
On May 22, 1995, a sharply-divided U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. Term Limits,
Inc. v. Thornton struck down state-imposed term limits for members of Congress. 8 '
The Court held that if congressional terms are to be limited, this must be done through
the amendment process prescribed by the Constitution in Article V.'8 Since U.S.
Term Limits is the first Supreme Court case in several years to deal directly with regu-
lation of federal elections, it deserves special attention here.
Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that primarily at
issue was whether the Qualifications Clauses were intended to be exclusive.'82 The
Constitution requires that a member of the House of Representatives be at least 25
years old and a citizen of the state represented for at least seven years.8 3 On the
Senate side, members must be at least 30 years old and a citizen of their state for at
least nine years. 4 In addition, Article I mandates that members of Congress reside
in the states they represent at the time they take office. These are the only qualifica-
tions the Constitution stipulates for membership in Congress. According to the U.S.
Term Limits majority, when Arkansas voters amended the Arkansas Constitution in
1992 by referendum so that their congressional delegation could not seek re-election,
178. NVRA provides that federal offices may also be used to register voters for federal elections,
but only with their consent. 42 U.S.C. §1973gg-5(a)(3)(B)(ii).
179. S. REP. No. 6, supra note 2.
180. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
181. Id. at 1845.
182. Id. at 1847.
183. U.S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
184. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
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the state effectively imposed an additional qualification-lack of prior service. 8 '
Textually, the Constitution is silent on whether Congress or the states may add to
the minimum residency, citizenship, and age criteria required by Article I. Justice
Stevens nonetheless offered three arguments to support the Court's conclusion that the
Qualifications Clauses were intended to be exclusive. First, term limits cannot be rec-
onciled with the other provisions in the Constitution that govern federal elections.
Second, the Framers' statements during the ratification debates reveal that they did
not want states to be able to impose term limits. And third, allowing states to limit
congressional terms would undermine the national character of the federal government.
The first and last of these points are of particular interest to the NVRA debate.
Citing the Elections Clause and other sections of Article I, the Court maintained
that "the text of the Constitution unquestionably reveals the Framers' distrust of the
States regarding [federal] elections."'' 6 According to Justice Stevens, one purpose be-
hind the Elections Clause was "to minimize the possibility of state interference with
federal elections."'8 7 Declaring that the national government was meant to be chosen
by the people and not the states, the majority argued that the Constitution "allows the
States but a limited role in federal elections, and maintains strict checks on state inter-
ference with the federal election process."'8 8 The Elections Clause, by giving broad
preemptive power to Congress, guaranteed that contests for that body would be held
regardless of what electoral processes states employed. The Framers' objective, ac-
cording to Justice Stevens, was that the federal government not be dependent on the
states for its existence. The Court concluded that the Framers would never have vested
such extensive authority in Congress on procedural matters, and then given the states
the ability essentially to undermine it by imposing additional qualifications.'89
The power of Congress under the Elections Clause was obviously not at issue in
U.S. Term Limits. Rather, the case concerned the validity of state action. However, the
Court's comments suggest that if again faced directly with the question, the authority
of Congress, as in the past, will be broadly construed. More precisely, the majority
emphasized repeatedly that all powers states possess over federal elections are delegat-
ed by the Constitution, and thus are not part of a state's "reserved" or "original"
powers."' Moreover, in the area of federal elections, Justice Stevens declared that the
Constitution gives Congress substantial leeway to step in when the states undermine
the uniform character of the national government. 9' This narrow reading of state
power, and broad reading of federal power, does not bode well for any state that de-
cides to challenge NVRA's constitutionality in the U.S. Supreme Court. It would be
perplexing for the Court to jealously protect the federal electoral process on the term
limits issue, and then subsequently hold that Congress could not regulate voter registra-
tion for its own elections.
Perhaps most interesting about U.S. Term Limits was the Court's discussion of
185. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1867.
186. Id. at 1859.
187. Id. at 1857.
188. Id. at 1864.
189. Id. at 1858. Writing for the dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas countered that the scope of the
congressional "make or alter" power under the Elections Clause has no impact on whether states may
impose additional qualifications on their congressional delegation. Id. at 1883.
190. Id.at 1856.
191. Id. at 1857.
1996]
Journal of Legislation
policy reasons for striking down Arkansas' constitutional amendment. Justice Anthony
Kennedy concurred separately to expand upon the underlying rationale for the majori-
ty's decision:
Federalism was our Nation's own discovery. The Framers split the atom of sov-
ereignty. It was the genius of their idea that our citizens would have two political
capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other.
The resulting Constitution created a legal system unprecedented in form and de-
sign, establishing two orders of government, each with its own direct relationship,
its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people who
sustain it and are governed by it.'
Thus, Justice Kennedy envisioned a dualistic federal system in which the states and
national government operate in distinct and separate spheres, each being prevented by
the Constitution from encroaching upon the sovereignty of the other.
More precisely, Justice Stevens claimed that state-imposed term limits overly
interfered with the federal government's side of this "coin" of sovereignty: "Permit-
ting individual States to formulate diverse qualifications for their representatives would
result in a patchwork of state qualifications, undermining the ... national character
that the Framers envisioned and sought to ensure."'" The majority ridiculed the no-
tion that the federal government was merely a collection of states, comparing a consti-
tutional world with term limits to the Articles of Confederation.'94 Justice Stevens
argued that term limits, by undermining the uniform nature of the federal government,
severed the "direct link" the Framers intended to create between the people and Con-
gress. 95 Also, on a more basic level, term limits simply offend the democratic princi-
ple that "the people should choose whom they please to govern them.'1
96
When applied to a constitutional adjudication of NVRA, the Court's policy
analysis in U.S. Term Limits offers something for each side in the debate. Justice Ken-
nedy's eloquent defense of American federalism could be construed in favor of the
states in the NVRA litigation. The Act's exclusive reliance on the arms of state gov-
ernment could conceivably be found to offend the "two orders of government" ratio-
nale underlying U.S. Term Limits.'97 If the Court decides eventually to extend the
same protection to state sovereignty as it did to federal sovereignty in U.S. Term Lim-
its, NVRA could indeed be found unconstitutional.
Upon closer examination, however, this result appears unlikely. Justice Kenne-
dy's concurring opinion notwithstanding, the majority reaffirmed that the area of
federal elections is a special one governed by different constitutional precepts. For
example, the Court noted that the administration of federal elections is one of the few
duties the Constitution explicitly places on the states. '9 Congressional power over
federal elections was again deemed supreme and substantial. Justice Stevens pointed to
192. Id. at 1872.
193. Id. at 1864.
194. Id. at 1855.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1845 (internal quotation omitted).
197. In upholding NVRA, the Ninth Circuit emphasized this point when it signalled its concern
that the law, depending on how it is applied, might offend the sphere of state sovereignty implicitly
deemed sacrosanct in Voting Rights Coalition v. Wilson, 60 F.3d 1411 (9th Cir. 1995).
198. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1855.
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both. specific constitutional provisions and speeches by the Framers to support his
conclusion that state sovereignty is simply a secondary concern when congressional
elections are at issue. When seen in this light, NVRA's use of state agencies to carry
out its detailed provisions is not nearly as offensive as at first glance.
In addition, NVRA is consistent with the majority's vision of a uniform national
government linked directly to the people. NVRA creates a uniform voter registration
system for federal elections, eliminating the "patchwork" of state laws that existed
before. Moreover, by making registration easier for Americans, the Act's underlying
purpose is to improve the "direct link" between the voters and federal officers that
Justice Stevens deemed so important in U.S. Term Limits. Consequently, even though
the Court has become increasingly concerned in recent years about protecting states'
rights, on the whole U.S. Term Limits sends a strong signal that, at least with regard to
federal elections, the residual power of Congress still trumps concerns about state
sovereignty.
B. Conclusion: Case Law
The Supreme Court's opinions construing the scope of congressional authority
to regulate federal elections, have if anything, expanded that power beyond what was
originally envisioned by the Framers and Ratifiers over 200 years ago. Although the
cases compel the conclusion that NVRA is constitutional, because the Act relies so
heavily on the states the its means of implementation need to be examined closely. The
Supreme Court in Siebold outlined a vision of concurrent jurisdiction that would seem
to dictate that when acting under Article I, Section 4, Congress has substantial leeway
to conscript the states to carry out federal law. However, Siebold is very old, and it did
not address the specific issues of voter registration and administrative costs. Its value
here is therefore open to question.
While Siebold is indeed not authoritative, the Necessary and Proper Clause
appears to legitimate NVRA's commandeering of state governments. After all, the
states are inherently better equipped to expand the number of registered voters because
their agencies and subdivisions come into daily contact with more citizens. However,
NVRA must climb one more hurdle under the Necessary and Proper Clause:
McCulloch specified that the means Congress employs in the exercise of its enumerat-
ed powers must be consistent with the "letter and spirit" of the Constitution. This
raises an important question: how does this limitation apply, if at all, to NVRA? Might
it implicate notions of state sovereignty?
This brings me to the role of the Tenth Amendment, and particularly the Su-
preme Court's recent decision in New York v. United States.'99
IV. THE TENTH AMENDMENT
A. Introduction
In the last twenty years, the Supreme Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence
has certainly taken an unsteady course. In 1985 the Court, reversing the 1976 National
League of Cities v. Usery2° decision, held in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
199. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
200. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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Transit Authority"0 ' that state sovereignty was meant to be protected by the role the
Constitution gives the states in the process by which representatives are selected, rather
than by judicial review. Seven years later, the Justices backpeddled from this "process"
theory in New York v. United States,02 when they held that the Tenth Amendment
proscribes the practice of conscripting the states to be "regional offices" or "adminis-
trative agencies" of the federal government.
This section assesses the relevance of the Tenth Amendment, and these two
decisions in particular, to adjudicating the constitutionality of the National Voter Reg-
istration Act.2"3 The specific problem here for Tenth Amendment purposes is whether
NVRA's reliance on the states to carry out its prescriptions intrudes upon state sover-
eignty in a way prohibited by New York or Garcia. To answer this question, Part IV is
divided into four sections. Section A reviews the holding and rationale of New York.
Section B examines the arguments in favor of applying New York's anti-commandeer-
ing rule to NVRA. Section C counters with two arguments for why New York does not
control a constitutional adjudication of NVRA. Finally, Section D explores the role of
process theories in the specific area of federal election regulation. Each of these points
will be discussed in turn.
1. The Holding and Rationale of New York
Writing for the majority, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor breathed new life into
the Tenth Amendment when she declared in New York that "[tihe Federal Government
may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program."2"
By a vote of 6-3, the Justices struck down a provision of the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985.205 Specifically at issue was the constitution-
ality of a "take title" provision that required New York State to arrange for the dispos-
al of all radioactive waste within its borders." 6 Alternatively, upon the owner's re-
quest the state would have to take title to the waste; failure to possess the waste
promptly would render New York liable for all damages resulting from continuing
possession in the hands of the original owner.2 7 Congress claimed to be acting under
the Commerce Clause when it directed New York to regulate in this fashion."8
Framing the issue to be "the circumstances under which Congress may use the
201. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
202. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2408.
203. One older case directly addressed the role of the Tenth Amendment when Congress acts pur-
suant to its power to regulate federal elections. United States v. Manning, 215 F. Supp. 272 (W.D. La.
1963), adhered to the general trend of granting Congress expansive authority:
[Niothing in the language or history of the Tenth Amendment gives the State exclusive
sovereignty over the election processes against the federal government's otherwise con-
stitutional exercise of a power within the scope of Article I, Section 4 .... In Justice
Holmes's phrase, this "is not a controversy between equals." It is necessary at this time
to say again, and underscore it, that within the area of delegated power, express or
implied, the Tenth Amendment does not reduce the powers of the United States. Id. at
277.
While interesting academically, the precedential value of Manning as a Tenth Amendment case is dubi-
ous in light of the confusion in the Supreme Court that began with National League of Cities.
204. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2435.
205. Id. at 2435.
206. Id. at 2416.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 2419-20.
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states as implements of regulation,"2" Justice O'Connor promulgated what has been
labeled the "autonomy of process" principle to hold the take title provision unconstitu-
tional.2"0 In an argument largely grounded on what it claimed to be the original intent
of the Framers, the majority asserted that the Constitution empowered Congress to
regulate individuals, but not states. 2 ' While the Tenth Amendment may indeed be
only a tautology, according to the Court the Constitution does not permit Congress to
interfere with the autonomous processes of state governments.
Justice O'Connor then delineated the circumstances under which Congress may
encourage states to regulate. First, Congress can condition a grant of federal funds on a
requirement that a state regulate private conduct in a particular way.2 2 Second, Con-
gress can offer states a choice between regulating or facing federal preemption.2 3
However, the take title provision fell in neither category because it left New York state
no choice but to regulate.2 ' Declaring that "[a] choice between two unconstitutional-
ly coercive regulatory techniques is no choice at all,"' 5 the Court struck down the
take title provision.
The majority explained at length why the mandatory nature of the law was so
constitutionally offensive. However, the essence of its argument was distilled in one
paragraph:
Where Congress encourages state regulation rather than compelling it, state gov-
ernments remain responsive to the local electorate's preferences; state officials
remain accountable to the people. By contrast, where the Federal Government
compels the States to regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials
is diminished.2 6
Concluding that the Tenth Amendment guaranteed to the states a certain measure of
autonomy, the Court held that Congress could not harness state legislative and execu-
tive processes to carry out federal policy.
2 7
209. Id.
210. See generally Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formula for the
Future, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1563 (1994).
211. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2421-23.
212. Id. at 2423.
213. Id. at 2424.
214. Id. at 2427-28.
215. Id. at 2428.
216. Id. at 2424.
217. Id. at 2435. It has been argued elsewhere that New York was correct about federal conscript-
ing of state legislatures, but wrong about the ability of Congress to rely on state executives to imple-
ment federal law. See Saikrishna B. Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REv. 1957 (1993).
On this particular point, Justice O'Connor's eagerness to reinvigorate the Tenth Amendment appears
to have effected occasional spells of intellectual dishonesty in her argument. For example, she quoted
Hamilton from the Federalist Papers to support the proposition that Congress may not commandeer
state legislatures: "The New National Government 'must carry its agency to the persons of the citizens.
It must stand in need of no intermediate legislations."' New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2422 (citation omit-
ted). However, she neglected to incorporate the rest of that particular paragraph: " . . . but [the federal
government] must itself be impowered to employ the arm of the ordinary magistrate to execute its
own resolutions." THE FEDERALIST No. 16, at 165 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed., 1961).
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2. How New York Might Apply to NVRA
Since Justice O'Connor's holding is phrased in such broad terms, it may be
argued that New York should also apply to the Elections Clause. A few sections of her
opinion convey the potential breadth of New York's anti-commandeering fiat:
[Riegulating pursuant to Congress' direction... would, standing alone, present a
simple command to state governments to implement legislation enacted by Con-
gress. As we have seen, the Constitution does not empower Congress to subject
state governments to this instruction." '
Later, the majority asserted:
No matter how powerful the federal interest involved, the Constitution simply does
not give Congress the authority to require the States to regulate .... Where a
federal interest is sufficiently strong to cause Congress to legislate, it must do so
directly; it may not conscript state governments as its agents." 9
Nowhere is the holding explicitly limited to the Commerce Clause. Nor should it be:
the underlying rationale of the case is no less applicable to most other grants of federal
power. What if Congress, for example, acting under Article I, conscripted the states to
execute federal immigration policy? This would certainly interfere with the autono-
mous processes of state governments in a way that New York would seem to prohibit.
The open-ended nature of the decision was probably deliberate, in order to leave the
Court the option of expanding (or limiting) the anti-commandeering rule in subsequent
cases. 
2 20
At first glance, the holding of New York appears right on point because state
governments under NVRA have no choice but to execute laws passed by Congress.
Indeed, the Act has been controversial because it strikes right at the heart of what New
York was all about: choice. NVRA forces state and local officials to take the political
heat for the administrative costs of implementing the law, while federal officials get to
claim the credit for its benefits. This is exactly the problem New York sought to elimi-
nate. In fact, NVRA in some ways seems an even better case for the autonomy of
process principle than the take title provision. Although the states were consulted dur-
ing the legislative process about the potential impact of expanded voter registra-
tion,2 2' Congress, in its passage of the NVRA, did not seek to forge a political con-
sensus on how to solve the problem at hand, as it had done in passing the Radioactive
Waste Policy Act. Rather, the law is yet another unfunded federal mandate; the states
were not offered any money to offset implementation costs.
The compulsory nature of the law, and states' reaction to it, admittedly make a
218. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2428.
219. Id. at 2429.
220. There is nevertheless a strong implication that the holding was primarily meant to apply to
the Commerce Clause. Justice O'Connor reiterated on several occasions the importance of preserving
state autonomy in the area of "federal regulatory programs"-an allusion to laws that compel or pro-
hibit certain forms of private conduct. Moreover, the Court distinguished Garcia on the ground that
"[Garcia] is not a case in which Congress has subjected a State to the same legislation applicable to
private parties." Id. at 2441.
221. See S. REP. No. 6, supra note 2. See also H.R. REP. No. 9, supra note 7.
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good prima facie case for expanding New York's anti-commandeering rule. However,
there are important differences between the Commerce Clause and the Elections
Clause, and these differences turn out to be dispositive.
3. Why New York Does Not Apply to NVRA
The most obvious (and important) distinction between NVRA and the take title
provision is that Congress was acting under an entirely different section of Article I in
New York: the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court indicated as early as National
League of Cities that different precepts might apply if another part of Article I was at
issue, as here.222 However, in light of the open-ended nature of New York, that Con-
gress enacted NVRA under the Elections Clause, standing alone, is an unconvincing
distinction. This section offers two arguments for why New York's rule against com-
mandeering should not apply when Congress preempts state law under Article I, Sec-
tion 4.
The regulation of commerce and the administration of elections are not at all
alike. In a laissez faire economy such as that in the United States, commerce is often
not regulated at all. As Americans, we have long held a general predilection against
government involvement in our private affairs. By contrast, elections are one of the
few activities government must carry out for a civilized society to function. Elections
could not be held whimsically; nor could their administration be privatized. Rather,
elections fall into a small and select class of government functions that are truly essen-
tial in nature. Others include policing, providing for the national defense, and coining
money.
The Constitution reflects the paramount importance of elections. It mandates that
congressional elections be held at least every two years, and prescribes specific condi-
tions under which each branch of the government is to be chosen. The policy question
the Framers had to address at the Constitutional Convention was where to place the
authority to hold these contests. In this regard, the Elections Clause is a built-in federal
mandate. 3 While the administration of elections was seen more as a privilege than a
duty 200 years ago, Article I, Section 4 still requires the states to prescribe the initial
rules for, and to conduct, federal elections.
By comparison, the Commerce Clause power is entirely discretionary in nature.
Congress and the states need not regulate interstate commerce at all, if they so
choose. 2 4 In light of the compulsory nature of state duties under the Elections
222. Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852 n.17.
223. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit emphasized this point in upholding NVRA,
and described the Elections Clause as a "fatal compromise" of state sovereignty. Acorn v. Edgar, 56
F.3d 791, 794, 796 (7th Cir. 1995). In U.S. Term Limits, the Supreme Court agreed with this con-
struction when it concluded that the Elections Clause is one of the few provisions in the Constitution
that requires the states to act. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1855. According to the Court, the man-
datory nature of states' obligations reflects the Framers' intent to create a direct link between the
American people and the federal government.
224. The Supreme Court recently placed new limits on the power of Congress when it acts under
the Commerce Clause. In United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), the Justices struck down
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, declaring that Congress could not prohibit gun possession
within 1000 feet of a school. While the full scope of the decision will not be clear for some time,
Lopez is significant because it may reflect a new willingness by the Court to protect certain state and
local prerogatives from federal interference. In light of the protection shown for the federal elections
process one month later in U.S. Term Limits, however, the relevancy of Lopez to the NVRA debate is
certainly open to question.
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Clause, Justice O'Connor's concerns about the accountability of state officials seem
misplaced-the states have no choice, unlike under the Commerce Clause, but to make
and enforce regulations. Commandeering may be undemocratic, and it may be a bad
way to make policy, but the Framers, at least in this instance, decided to turn the states
into agents of the federal government. They must prescribe the first set of regulations
unless Congress takes preemptive action.
Circumstances admittedly change when Congress exercises its explicit power to
make new regulations. When states are administering federal elections under their own
rules, they are still to some degree masters of their own destiny, even if they cannot
avoid the duty altogether. The Elections Clause gives Congress the power to "make or
alter"; it does not say "and also conscript." Thus, it may be argued that the same pre-
cepts the Supreme Court applied to the Commerce Clause in New York apply
here-Congress may not use the states as implements of regulation. Or, as Justice
Field put it in his dissent in Ex Parte Clarke, the federal government may use state
officials only "upon the conditions which the state may impose." '225
This view, however, ignores the reasons Congress was given the power to pre-
empt state law in the first place. The Framers believed substantial authority in Con-
gress was necessary in order to protect the right of the people to elect the government,
and to ensure that all provisions of the Constitution pertaining to the electoral process
were respected. The mandatory nature of state duties under the Elections Clause thus
reflects a policy choice: state sovereignty, where necessary, was meant to be subsumed
to the greater public interest in maintaining the purity of the electoral process. When
seen in this light, conscripting the states is implied in the authority to "make or alter."
NVRA's heavy reliance on the states to carry out its provisions is an exercise of this
implied power. Moreover, no case has ever held that where the power to decide and
the duty to implement are separated, as here, the federal government must foot the bill.
The Supreme Court has declared on many occasions that the Tenth Amendment
is merely a tautology. In New York, Justice O'Connor, generally known to be sympa-
thetic to states' rights, conceded that "[ilf a power is delegated to Congress in the
Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power
to the States[.] ' '226 The Court nonetheless concluded that the Tenth Amendment was
violated because Congress was not actually regulating interstate commerce. Rather,
Congress was impermissibly directing New York State to regulate interstate commerce.
The factual and legal circumstances surrounding NVRA are different. If it is accepted
that voter registration constitutes part of the "manner" of federal elections, then the
constitutional power to "make or alter" gives Congress explicit textual authority to pass
legislation governing the registration process. The focus then shifts to whether NVRA
may use the states as implements of regulation.
The dispositive factor in answering this question is the role of the Necessary and
Proper Clause, which was not at issue in New York. As discussed in Part III, requiring
states to adopt agency-based voter registration seems to pass the rational relationship
test handed down in McCulloch. As to whether this method is also consistent with the
"letter and spirit" of the Constitution, in light of New York, this may be open to ques-
tion. However, the Court has never so animated the "letter and spirit" language that a
225. Clarke, 100 U.S. at 413.
226. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2417.
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law otherwise permissible under McCulloch has been declared unconstitutional. Thus,
the real issue here is whether the Tenth Amendment can reduce the delegated powers
Article I gives to Congress. Even though New York did not explain how its anti-com-
mandeering fiat might impact the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause, if the
Tenth Amendment is really a tautology, the answer should be clear. In this important
sense, NVRA is nothing like the take title provision. The former may interfere with
state sovereignty, but it does so in a valid exercise of express and implied constitution-
al authority. On the other hand, New York involved a federal statute that tried to
masquarade as an expression of a delegated power. The Supreme Court. was not
fooled.
More recently, in U.S. Term Limits, the Justices were called upon to address a
Tenth Amendment argument in the specific context of federal elections. The state of
Arkansas maintained that the authority to limit terms for its members of Congress was
part of its "original powers," and thus was reserved to the state under the Tenth
Amendment.22' Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens rejected this interpretation,
concluding that all powers over federal elections are delegated by the Constitution:
"Petitioners' Tenth Amendment argument misconceives the nature of the right at issue
because that Amendment could only "reserve' that which existed before.
22
U.S. Term Limits addressed a different aspect of the Tenth Amendment than that
at issue in the NVRA debate. Unlike the term limits controversy, NVRA concerns not
the textual meaning of the Tenth Amendment, but rather whether the Act
impermissibly intrudes on state sovereignty. Hence, as a Tenth Amendment case, U.S.
Term Limits initially appears of limited relevance to the controversy surrounding
NVRA. However, the term limits question did give the Supreme Court an additional
opportunity to expand the Tenth Amendment beyond New York, and the Justices de-
clined to do so. While Tenth Amendment jurisprudence in the 1990s has indeed been
increasingly volatile and convoluted, U.S. Term Limits permits the tentative conclusion
that state sovereignty arguments will continue to hold little sway with the Court when
the issue is federal elections.
4. Process Theories and Federal Elections
New York left unclear to what extent its opinion superseded the "process" theory
the Court promulgated in Garcia seven years earlier.2 9 In fact, whether the two cases
can even be reconciled is open to question.23° Is New York an exception to Garcia's
general rule that states are to look to the political process for relief when they feel
Congress is encroaching on their sovereignty? Or does New York represent yet another
sea change in the Justices' thinking about the Tenth Amendment? These questions
227. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1853.
228. Id. at 1853-54.
229. For further discussion of process theories, see generally JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME
COURT (1980); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954).
230. On this point, see Richard E. Levy, New York v. United States: An Essay on the Uses and
Misuses of Precedent, History, and Policy in Determining the Scope of Federal Power, 41 KAN. L.
REV. 493 (1993). The inconsistency between Garcia and New York, to the extent that one exists, can
perhaps best be explained by changes in the Court's membership between 1985 and 1992. Two Jus-
tices that were in the Garcia majority (Brennan and Marshall) left the Court by the time New York
was decided; their replacements, Justices Souter and Thomas, sided with the majority in New York.
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unfortunately were left unaddressed. However, this section assumes Garcia is not
completely dead, and analyzes the role of process theories in a constitutional assess-
ment of NVRA.
As discussed in Parts I and II, many of the Framers and Ratifiers viewed the
primary check on the power of Congress to regulate federal elections to be political
and structural in nature, and not legal. In this sense, the logic of Garcia is especially
applicable here: statements by Madison and others who asserted that the Constitution
provided adequate safeguards against abuse almost seem lifted straight from the opin-
ion."' Therefore, to the extent that Garcia is still good law after New York, its pro-
cess theory counsels against using the Tenth Amendment to set aside the National
Voter Registration Act, even though the law in some ways does impinge upon state
sovereignty.
Perhaps most persuasive is that, with regard to NVRA, Garcia's process argu-
ment actually has some merit. Six bills have been introduced in the 104th Congress
that would repeal NVRA,232 delay its enforcement until the federal government ap-
propriates funds to pay for its implementation,233 or make compliance with the law
voluntary."' While the motives of the bills' sponsors-all Republicans-may indeed
be somewhat partisan, the costs NVRA imposes on state and local governments were
the main reason cited for seeking to modify its scope. The states may be unable ulti-
mately to effect a repeal of the Act, but as this Article went to press it appeared likely
that NVRA will eventually be "fine tuned" to address some of the states' concerns.235
More generally, the political climate in Washington has clearly changed in response to
states' complaints about the costs of unfunded mandates. With the passage of the Un-
funded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, states and municipalities recently were able to
secure prospective relief from the expense of laws such as NVRA. 236 Thus, as Garcia
envisioned, the political process appears to be working.
B. Conclusion: The Tenth Amendment
To summarize, I believe the National Voter Registration Act passes constitutional
muster under the Tenth Amendment. The policies underlying New
York-accountability and choice--do not apply to NVRA because the states have no
option but to prescribe rules for, and administer, federal elections. State duties are
therefore very different than under the Commerce Clause. The mandatory nature of the
Elections Clause, and the broad preemptive authority it has been construed to afford
231. Or perhaps it was the other way around: Garcia is an originalist analysis predicated upon the
intent of many of the specific Framers discussed here.
232. S. 218, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 370, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
233. S. 91, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 736, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
234. H.R. 60, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 326, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
235. Telephone Interview with Holly Wiseman, supra note 15.
236. Were NVRA enacted today, Congress would be required by statute to consider its implementa-
tion costs. On March 22, 1995, President Clinton signed the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
into law. Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (March 22, 1995). The Act aims to relieve the governmen-
tal and private sectors of the cost of complying with certain types of federal legislation. More specifi-
cally, the Act requires Congress to identify funding sources for mandates whose aggregate costs to
states and municipalities exceed $50 million, or vote by a three-fifths majority to waive the congressio-
nal funding requirement. Courts cannot challenge the quality or conclusions of cost assessments; judi-
cial review is limited to whether a cost analysis was ever performed. This legislation does not affect
NVRA because it is not retroactive.
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Congress, reflect a policy decision by the Framers to subsume state sovereignty, where
necessary, to the greater public interest in a sound and responsive electoral process.
Consequently, conscripting the states to carry out new regulations is implied in the
power to "make or alter." To the extent such commandeering is not legitimated by the
text of Article I, Section 4 itself, this authority alternatively arises out of the Necessary
and Proper Clause. Since it is well settled that the Tenth Amendment cannot reduce
express and implied constitutional powers, NVRA is constitutional.
Moreover, the political process was exactly the remedy that was intended if
Congress ever abused its power to set rules for federal elections. Assuming NVRA
crossed this line by overly relying on state resources to carry it out, recent legislative
activity in Washington demonstrates that, as the Framers predicted, the political pro-
cess is self-correcting. This is further reason to keep the Tenth Amendment, and the
federal courts, out of the picture. While there may indeed be circumstances under
which an Act of Congress that regulates federal elections violates the Tenth Amend-
ment, those circumstances are not present here.23
CONCLUSION
The National Voter Registration Act is unique in the history of voting rights
enactments. Unlike during Reconstruction or the Civil Rights Movement, the evil Con-
gress seeks to eradicate with NVRA is not racism or other forms of prejudice. Today,
at least in theory, any person eligible to vote may do so, regardless of race, religion,
sex, national origin, economic status or any other personal characteristic. This basic
freedom is found in few other countries the way it is here.
By contrast, the concerns of the 1990s are rather different. The problem now is
an unprecedented degree of non-participation that transcends all classes, creeds, and re-
gions of the country. If there is truth to the accusation that Washington is out of touch,
this is maybe because it can afford to be: at least 40% of eligible citizens regularly fail
to cast ballots in federal elections. By doing its part to enable more Americans to get
involved in the democratic process, NVRA may well engender the next revolution in
voting rights.
Besides being a laudable effort, NVRA is also a constitutional one. To the extent
that the law imposes costs on states, or interferes with their sovereignty, it does so in a
valid exercise of constitutional authority. Since the American system places the onus of
registering on the individual rather than on the state, I believe the Framers would agree
that it is within the federal government's power to make the registration process as
convenient and accessible as possible for citizens who want to participate. In this
sense, policy and constitutional law overlap, and point to the same result.
While Americans may also simply be increasingly apathetic, the administrative
necessity of registration should not be turned into a test of how strongly Americans
care about exercising their right to vote. As Congress noted before NVRA was enact-
ed, this is not the point. Rather, the objective of our electoral process has always been
237. Citing U.S. Term Limits, both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits suggested that NVRA might
violate the Tenth Amendment if state resources were conscripted so extensively that states effectively
could not carry out their own elections. However, both courts concluded that at present no such show-
ing could be made. Acorn v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 796 (7th Cir. 1995); Voting Rights Coalition v.
Wilson, 60 F.3d 1411 (9th Cir. 1995).
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to ascertain the will of the people. When seen in this light, it is remarkable that Con-
gress did not act sooner.
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